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11The 'Question of the Straits' is one of the oldest 
and most persistent problems in European history. 11 Its age 
is unknown to us for references are made to this important 
commercial and. s.trategio post even in the mythology of Greek 
antiquity. The T~ojan wars were fought for so~der reasons 
than Helens, The cities of Troy cont~olled tpe v~luable 
trade from the ~ine from their ve.nt~ge point on the Dar-
danelles, Either tha trade~e had to trade at Troy or else 
toll~ and dues were collected as the phips from the Medi-
terranean were transferred across the narrow spit of sand 
before the city, In an attempt to reach the source of supply 
it was necessary to destroy the control of this passageway 
or to lose the valuable trade, The Greeks under Agamemnon 
gained a control of the Hellespont which secured the path 
to the rich regions of the Black Sea Areas enabling Greece 
to grow and Athens to expand, Athens by placing colonies 
and dependencies held an unbroken route to the Euxine and 
defended that policy much as Britain defends the route to 
India at the present time. 
Under the Roman Empire there was no question of the 
Straits for the simple reason that by the time that Rome 
had reached the Black Sea her sea rivals had all been des-
troyed. Furthermore the grain supply from the Euxine so 
important to Athens came from Africa during the Roman period. 
ii 
The route to the east was of more importance to Rome at this 
time than the route to the Black Sea. 
From 330 to 1453 A.D., Constantinople became first the 
stra~egic position on the land route from the west to the 
east , and. then the important trading center of the eastern 
Empire. During this period the Italian cities had to cope 
with the "Question of the Straits" among themselves. For 
them, it was merely a commercial question. For the Greeks 
it was an important question since the ctty needed to be 
defended against the onslaught of the Moslems by means of 
the city's strong walls and by the active fleet in the 
Straits. 
The conquest of the Straits by the Turks, beginning 
around the middle of the fourteenth century lasted for 
about an hundred years. They accomplished this conquest in 
1453. Gradually the Turks were able to extend their control 
over the entire Black Sea Area, .end until that time the 
Black Sea was not entirely closed to trade. However, be-
ginning in 1475 and lasting until 1774, the Black Sea was 
considered as a "virgin sea.". Not until Russia had estab-
lished herself upon the northern shores of the Black Sea did 
Turkey give up her exclusive control over all shipping with-
in that body of water. By the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, all of the important countries of Europe had gained 
permission to pass their commerce through the Straits into 
the Black Sea. The problem of commercial freedom during 
iii 
peace time was pretty well settled, but Turkey through her 
control was able to prevent foreign warships from using the 
Straits and from entering the Black Sea. 
The problem of naval vessels in the Black Sea began 
during the Napoleonic period when the Russian warships pass-
ed the Straits on several oooasions, and even the British 
fleet · succeeded in forcing its way to Consta.n.tinople. But 
with the Treaty or Tilsit in 1807 the "ancient rule of the 
Ottoman Empire" wae recognized by Great aritain and warships 
were fo~ally e~oluded from the Straits. Until 1914 these 
two views not only prevailed but were strengthened by vari-
ous conventions and treaties, (1) Increasing freedom was 
secured for merchant vessels of all flags 1 and (2) European 
public law finally recognized the principle of the closing 
of the Straits to foreign warships during peace time. The 
realization of the first named principle received no opposi-
tion1 but the latter of the two principles was continually 
opposed by Russia during the nineteenth century and the be-
ginning or the twentieth century. While England supported 
firmly the "ancient rule 11 which forbade entrance of war 
vessels, Russia tried in vain to open the passageway. 
This in brief is the historical setting when the world 
War broke out in the summer of 1914. The purpose of this 
paper is to give an account of the events which took place 
during the years 1914-1923 in the establishment of a "New 
Regime of the Straits." 
1 
CHAPTER I 
Russia the Entente and the Straits 1914-1917 
At the beginning of 1914 opinion in Russia regarding 
the possible acquisition of the Straits and Constantinople 
was, that reali zation of such aims were only poss~ble in 
the event of a general European confl agration.l However, 
in spite of this attitude, pr epara tions were ma de for the 
seizure of the Straits by force, possibly by 1917, in the 
event that a genera l war did not materialize.2 Russia n 
plans for the acquisition of the Strai t s were seriously 
compromised because of the German influence at Constan-
tinople. The mi s sion of Liman von Sanders had ga ined for 
Germany the ascendancy over Russi£tl1 influence in Turkey. 
Russia's political and economic development in this direc-
tion wa s hindered because Germany, if Turkey should. collapse, 
would undoubtedly obtain a l a r g e slice of Turkey. If, on 
the other hand, Turkey successful ly maintained herself 
Germany might ma ke a colony of her.3 
Consequently a t the beg inning of the wa r Germany was 
able through her l1Hssion at Constantinople to conclude an 
1. See discussion concerning Sa zonov a nd his views in Fay, 
S.B., The Origi~ of the World War, I, pp. 524, et seq. 
2. Ibid., pp. 524-529. 
3. See Kerner, R. J., "Russi::t the Straits and Constantinople 
1914-1915" Journal o:t Modern History, I, pp. 400-403, 
September, 1929 •. 
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alliance with Turkey. This was accomplished on August 2, 
1914, while Russia was still trying to negotiate e. Russo-
Turkish e.lliance.l This alliance was secretly negotiated, 
signed, and maintained in secrecy till early in November, 
1914. 
In the meantime the Allies tried to induce Turkey to 
remain neutral in the conflict, offe~ing to respect the 
territorial integl'ity of Turkey in return fol' hel.' neutre.l-
ity.2 But Turkey becoming indignant over the seizure of 
two Turkish wa~ships being 'built in Great Britain refused, 3 
Russia had done all in her power to keep Turkey out of 
the war despite her recognized designs on Turkey. 
Russia's allies, however, were unwilling to make the 
necessary concessions regarding the other Balkan States. 4 
At this period, before war broke out between the Allies 
and TurkeyJ there were two views expressed. in Russia re-
ge.rding the Stra.i ts under the circumstances then existing. 
M. Krivocheine, the Minister of Agriculture during the 
period 1908-1914 thought that the Straits ought to be free, 
the Turks should be driven into Asia, and Constantinople 
ought to be made a neutral city .5 However M. Sasonov when 
1. Ibid.J P• 403-404. 
2. ~Edward Grey in the House of Commons, October 1~-s, 1915, 
Cocks, F. s., The Secret Treaties, p. 43. 
3. Kerner, R. J., ~:-cit., p. 405 and 406. 
4. Ibid., P• 405. 
5. ~ivocheine to M. Paleologue, French min. to Russia, 
September 25, 1914. Golder, F. A., Documents of 
Russian History 1914-1917, p. 58. 
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interrogated by M. Pa leologue sta ted tha t all Russia de-
", / ' / 
sired at this time 11 Q,uant a liberte des Detroits elle nous 
doit etre garantie eta trois conditione: 1, qutaucune 
fortification ne puisse etre erig ee sur lea flancs des 
Darda nelles, 2, qu'une commission assistee d'une force 
nava le fasse la police da ns les Da rdanelles et le Mer de 
Ma rmora, 3, que l a Rus s ia a it a l'entree interieure du 
·. I I 
i3 osphore--pa. r example a. Douj oul<:dere--une sta t i on de cha r-
bon, Cette question est pour noua d'un int ~r~t vita l. 
Impossible de plus en diffe~er la solut~on. 111 
A last opportunity wus of fered Turkey to remain neu-
tra l, , even after the foreign ambassadors had been reca lled, 
on condition tha t Turkey should dismiss the Germa n officers 
in the Turkish army and navy.2 Turkey refused this offer and 
hostilities broke out between Turkey and the Allies, 
This rupture wa s met in Russia by a grea t deal of 
enthusiasm. The g enera l a ttitude wa s simila r to this ex -
pression: 11 The sick ma n is dying--wha t is to be done with 
1. 11 As for the liberty of the Stra its, it must be gua r an-
teed to us, a nd on three conditions: 1, tha t no forti-
fic a tions be erected on the ba nks of the Dardanelles, 
2, tha t a com~ission, as sisted by a nava l force, police 
the Da rdanelles and t he Sea of Ma rmora , 3, tha t Russia 
may have a coa ling st a tion a t the ~nner entrance of the 
Bosphorus--for exa mple at B oujoukder~. This question 
is a vital interest for us, it is impossible to delay 
the solution any long er .. 11 Trans. b7 the present a u-
thor. ~ . Pal~ologue to hl . Delca ssd, September 26, 1914. 
Prokovski, M. N., Ts aiska i a Ros s iia i Voina , pp. 75-77, 
quoted in Golder, F. A., .2.12.· cit., pp7 58-59. 
2. Saz~nov to Benckendorf, November 1, 1914, Kerner, R.J., 
Qll• cit., p. 407. 
4 
the inheritance?" Prof. Alexieff of Moscow thought that 
the Straits should be neutralized and Constantinople made 
a free town.l Others believed that the Black Sea should 
be made into a Russian lake with entrance and exit control-
led exclusively by Russia, the Bosphorus being made into a 
Russian Gibraltar,2 Still another thought that it made 
little difference who controlled Constantinople as long as 
Russia held the Straite,3 The edito~ of the Pttrograd Ex-
change Gasette concluded an inquiry made conce~ning the 
Straits by emPhasizing the necessity of Russia's gaining 
a free passage through the Straits, "'Russia. is the nat .. 
ural heir of Turkey in Europe,'" the possession of . the 
Straits and adjacent territory is necessary first~ before 
an economic and political union in the Balkans can be ac-
complished, "'Such a task is alone worthy of Russia and 
the sacrifices demanded by the present war.' "4 Even the 
Czar was caught in the whirl and in a manifesto called on 
Russia to fulfil her "historic mission" on the shores of 
the Black Sea,5 England, realizing the strategic impor-
tance of keeping Russia. enthusiastic concerning the war, 
as early as November 9, 1914, informed the Russian Ambassador 
1. Hoschiller, M., L'Europe davant Constantinople, (Paris, 
1916), pp. 78-79, quotea In Phillipson and Buxton, 
The Question of ~he Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, 
p. 200. 
2. Ibid,, p. 201. 
3. Prof. Kotliarievsky, quotr~d in Phillipson and Buxton, 
~·cit., p. 201. 
4. Ibid,, P• 203. 
5, Kerner, R.J., ~· cit., p. 407. 
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at London th.:1. t the question of the Straits would be settled 
11 in conformity" with Russian interests.l The Czar clari-
fied the meaning of "in conformity wi th Russ i :=m interests" 
on November 26, 1914, in a conversation with the French 
Minister at Petrograd. " 1 There are two conclusions to 
which I am always being brought back, first, that the Turks 
muet be expelled from Euro:pe , secondly, that Constantinople 
, / 
must in the future be neutral, with an international regime • 
••• western Thrace to the Enos-Media line should be given to 
Bulgaria. The rest from that line to the shores of the 
Str~its, but excluding the environs of Constantinople, 
would be assigned to Russia.' n2 
The Allied Attack on the Dardanelles 
Early in January 1915, Winston Churchill was success-
ful in putting through a plan of campaign against the Dar ... 
danelles, a plan which he adopted at the outbreak of the 
war and which he defended with a gres.t deal of persistency 
and enthusiasm. Such a plan, if successfully prosecuted, 
held out numerous advantages for the Allies' cause, among 
them being the opening of Russia's southern ports to the 
trade of the Allies, and the influencing of the Balkan 
1. Benckendorf to Sazonov, November 9, 1914, No. 649, Adamov, 
Konstantinolle i Proli!I, I, p. 228, quoted in Kerner, 
R. J. , .2£ • c t • , - p • 407 • 
/ -2. Paleo1ogue, La Russia des tsars pendant la ~rande guerre, 
(Paris, 1921), I, pp. 199-200 1 quoted Inerner, R.J., 
.££. cit. ' p. 408. 
6 
states to join the Entente.l Churchill had hoped to secure 
Russian cooperation in the attack, but despite Sazonov's 
appeals to the general staff Russia refused to participate 
in the expedition. As early a s December 18, 1914, Grand 
Duke Nicholas declared that "'the seizure of the Straits b y 
our troops e.lone was entirely out of the question,' 11 2 and 
when Sazonov reported to headquarters the Bri tish plan the 
Grand Duke approved t he British program, but refused to 
aid by sending t r oops.2 The inability of Rus ~ia to send 
troops to the Darda.neJl e s was thought to jeopardize the 
Russian chances of realization of her desire s during the 
early days of February, Thus Prince Kudashev, representa-
tive of the ministry of foreign affairs at the army head~ 
quarters, wrote to Sazonov February +0/23, 1915, that in 
case the Allied attack on the Dardanelles was successful 
and Britain offered the Straits to Russi s., she would not be 
· able to accept the Strait s , and the Allies could only con-
elude peace with Turkey. 
"'And therefore, the solution of the problem of the 
Straits "in accordance with our interests" as we, vvho treas-
ure the historical inheritance of our past, understand them, 
will not take place. We must not only reckon with this 
1. Mr. Balfour in the 19th meeting of the War Council, 
January 28, 1915, Churchill, w.s., The World Crisis, 
II, p. 162. ---
2. Florinsky, M.T., "A Page of Diplomatic History; Russian 
Military Leaders and the Problem of Constantinople 
During the War," Poli tj._s~]: _?cience g_u~rterl}· , XLIV, 
P• 111, March, 1929. 
7 
harsh fact but, ••• accept it, and endeavor to prepare pub-
lic opinion for it ••• The annexation of Constantinople not 
only now, when so many external conditions are so unfavor-
able to u.s , but even for a long time to come, will remain 
a mere dream, because we s.re lacking in the moral and mili-
tary power necessary to me.ke it come true.•"l 
This pessinustic outlook was changed somewhat when 
the news of the first general attack on the Dardanelles 
we.s lmovm. The Allied expedition had accomplished a suc-
cessful naval attack, February 19, to March 2, 1915 1 e.nd 
the reverberations h eld shaken all Europe a.s ·well as · the 
Entente. But owing to poor mana.gernent practically all of 
the adventages which had been gained were lost. Neverthe-
less the chance was taken by Russia to secure more definite 
pronouncements from her Allies regarding their attitude to .. 
ward Russian interests in the region. On February 19 
(March 4, 1915), the Minister for Foreign Affairs handed 
to the French and British .Amba.ssadors a memorandun1 stating 
the desire on the part of Russia to Bdd certain territories 
to Russia a s a result of the WB.r. 
"'The tovm of Constantinople, the western coast of the 
Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmore., B.nd the Dardanelles; Southern 
Thrace, as far as the Enos Media line; the coast of Asia 
Minor between the Bosphorus and the river Sakaria and a 
point on the Gulf of Ismid to be defined later; the islands 
in the Sea of Marmora, and the isl~ds of Imbros and Tenedos. 
The special rights of France and England in the above ter-
ritories were to remain inviolate. 
"'Both the French and British Governments express 
theil~ J.'(~ediness to agree to our wi shes , providecl tb e r:nr 
is won and provided a number of claims made by France and 
1. Prince Kudashev to Sazonov, February 10/:33, 1915, quoted 
in Florinsky, M.T., ~·~it., p. 112. 
England, both in the Ottomm1 Empire and in other places 
are satisfied. 
8 
111 As far as Turkey is concerned, these claims are as 
follows: 
11 
'Constantinople is to be recognized as a free port 
for the free transit of goods not proceeding from or to 
Russia, and a free passage is to be given through the 
Straits to merchant ships.•"l 
In the meantime, Great Britain had sought the aid of 
Greece in her e~ped~tion against the Straits wnen Russian 
help was not forthcoming. But Russia learning of this, 
promptly informed the Russian Minister at Atheps, sending 
copies to London and Puris, t.hat Russia could not permit 
the Greek troops to participate with the Allied forces in 
the capture of Constantinople.2 Russia feared that Greece 
might become interested in realizing her own "historic 
mission", for it must be remembered that Greece had had 
at one time some very real connections with Constantinople. 
In a memorandum to Sir George Buchanan, British Minister at 
Petrograd, Great Britain rebuked Russia for her attitude 
regarding Greek participation in the attack on the Dardan-
elles, stating that if Russia. were unable to aid in the 
e.ttack she should place no hindre.nces in the way of other's 
help.3 
1. Cocks, F.S., ~· cit., PP• 19-20. 
2. Sazonov to Demidov, March 2, 191 5, Adamov, Konstantin-
opol i Proli Y.:i.., I, p. 189, quoted in Kerner, R. J. , · 
~· cit., p. 412. 
3. Memo. to Sir George Buchanan, Brit. min. to Petrograd, 
March 12, 1915, Pokroski, M.N., Tsarskaia Rossiia i 
Voina, p. 82-5, quoted in Golder, F.A., op. c~t .• , p. 61. 
Russia had stated her desires but no definite reply 
w.as given by the French or ~nglish regarding them. Eng-
' land and France were not too enthusiastic over the pros-
pects of assenting to the Russian claims. Both made at-
tempts to pass the matter off to the other. But Russia 
won ld not be satisfied with the half-hearted responses 
that were made to her appeals, and Sazonov•s continued 
9 
efforts resulted in an announcement from the Brit!sh Gov-
ernment • . Sir Edward Grey in reply to the Russian queries 
stated that: 
" ••• the claim made by the Imperial Government in their 
Aide-Memoire of February 19 (March 4, 1915), considerably 
exceeds the desiderata which were foreshadowed by M. sazonov 
as probable a few weeks ago. Before His Majesty's Govern-
ment have had time to take into consideration what their 
desiderata elsewhere would be in the final terms of peace, 
Russia is asking for a definite promise that her wishes 
shall be satisfied with regard to what is the richest prize 
of the entire war. Sir Edward Grey accordingly hopes that 
M. Sazonov will realize tha t it is not in the power of His 
Majesty's Government to g ive a greater proof of friendship 
than that which is afforded by the terms of the above men-
tioned Aide- IVIemoire. That document involves a complete re-
versal of the traditional policy of His Majesty's Govern-
ment and is in direct opposition to the opinions and senti-
ments at one time universa lly held in England and which have 
still by no me ans died out. S:lr Edward Grey therefore 
trusts that the Imperial Government will recognize that t~e 
recent general assurances given to M. Sazonov have be en 
most loyally and amply fulfilled."l 
In return for the richest prize of the war, Russia con-
firmed its " ••• assent to the establishment (1) of free 
transit through Constantinople f or all goods not proceeding 
from or proceeding to Russia, and (2) free passage 
1. Sir . Edward Grey to Sir Geo. Buchanan, Brit. min. to 
Petrograd. Pokroski, M.N., Tsarskala Rossiia i Voina, 
pp. 82-85, quoted in Golder, F.A., op. cit., pp.60-61. 
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through the Straits fo1~ merchant vessels ••• ttl Mutual guar-
antees were also given to res~ect each others interests in 
other regions, notably Persi~. 
Sazonov now attempted to gain the assent of France to 
the fulfillment of Russia's desires. He stated the reasons 
why it was reasonable for Fra.nce to acquiesce in the matter 
in a note to the Russian Minister at Paris. 
"On February 2:3 (March e, 1915) I tn~ French Ambassador 
on behalf of his Government, announced to me (Sazonov) 
that France we.s prepared to take a most favol:'able attitude 
in the matter of r ealization of our desi~es as set out in 
my telegram to you, No. 937,2 in respect of the Straits and 
Constantinople ••• " · 
"In his converse.tions with you ,Delcasse had previously 
more than once given his assurance that we could rely on 
the sympathy of France, and only referred to the needs of . 
elucidating the question of the attitude of England, from 
whom he feared some objections before he could give us a 
more definite assurance in the above sense. Now the British 
Government has given its complete consent in writing to the 
annexation by Russia of the Straits and Constantinople with .. 
in the limits indice.ted by us, and only demanded security 
for its economic interests and a simile.r benevolent atti-
tude on our part towards the political aspirations of Eng-
land in other parts !'3 
It was not until April 10, 1915, however, that Russia 
received the French assurances pledging Constantinople and 
the Straits to her. 
"'On April 23 and 24, during the negotiations for 
Italy's entrance into the war, Sazanov obtained a final 
formal agreement from England and France to the effect 
that the agreements already made by the Allies remain in 
1. M. Sazonov to Russian min. to London, March 7/20, 1915, 
Cocks, F.s., ~· cit., p. 22. 
2. See above, p. 9. 
3. Sazonov to Russian min. t o Paris, March 18, 1915, Cocks, 
F~Se, ~·cit., PP• 17-18. 
lf.*o!U'"' ... ' 
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full force and ca n not be revised on the occasion of Ita lv's 
a dhesion to the Decla ration of September 5, 1914.'"1 · 
Russia had now completed ~11 of the necess a ry diplo-
matic details leading to the fu l fillment of her "historic 
mission''; the remainder of the task could only be accom-
plished by force of arms. The success of the Russian dip-
lomatic efforts was due ma inly. to the persistence and ten-
acity of Sazonov. It wa e l l"l.r gely throug h his work tha t 
Russia gained the Allies' recognition of Russia'e "special 
interest" in the a rea of the Stra its. 
It might be a sked •nhy ·Prance a nd England consented to 
the requests of Russia leading to the acquisition of the 
Straits. Althoug h it is not cert~ in, the answer can pro-
bably be tra ced to those events which followed the outbreak 
of the War . Vfuen hostilities began, Russia was cut off 
from her Allies in the ~est. With the first heavy attacks 
on the Eastern front came a realiza tion that Russia wa s ill 
prepa red for a conflict of such magnitude. This realization 
was borne out and Russia suffered immense losses, acc ompa nied, 
of couroe, with a good dea l of dishea rtenment. The need of 
encourag ement in the da rk hours was recognized, and such 
encouragement as could be given by the Allies w6uld un-
doubtedly have helped the general cause.2. 
1 .. Brit .. Memo., April ~23, French Memo., April 24, 1915, 
Adamov, Konstantinopl~ J. Prolivy, I, p. 332, quoted 
in Kerner , R . J . , .QJ2... c it ~ , 1) .. 414 • 
2. Churchill, W.S., ..Q.J2· cit., II, p. 198. 
Suggestions for the Disposition of 
Constantinople and the Straits 
12 
During the ,first years of the War a great deal of pop-
ular discussion was carried on in the various countries 
concerning the ultimate disposition of Constantinople and 
the Straits. Phillipson and Buxtonl writing in 1917, 
listed ten possible ways in which the problem migbt be 
settled, 
11 (1) Constantinople might be handed ov~r to Russia; 
(2) Constantinople to be a free port under the R~aeian fleg; 
(3) Constantinople to be placed under Belgian rule; (4) 
Constantinople to be established as an autonomous state, 
whose civil administration to be in the hands of the local 
Greek population, and the military guardianship to be temp-
ore.rily in the hands of the United States; (5) Constantinople 
to be a free tovm and port under the collective guarantee 
of the Powers; (6) as for the Straits, freedom of passage 
to be granted to all vessels of all nations, Turkish control 
remaining; (7) The Straits to be handed over to Russia.; 
(8) The Bosphorus to be given to Russia and the Dardanelles 
to another Power; (9) The Black Sea to be made a Russian 
lake; (10) The Straits to be internationalized, and a re-
gime similar to that of the Suez Canal or the Panama Canal 
to be set up. "2 
There were some people in Russia who believed that 
Russian possession of Constantinople and the Straits might 
work against Russie.n interests,3 Even internationalization 
was a most difficult task to accomplish.3 Prince Kudashev, 
it will be remembered, stated that he believed that Russia 
1. Phillipson and Buxton, The Question of the Bosphorus 
and the Dardanel:i'es, p:-2·24, et seq. --
2. Ibid.,-p7 2G4, et seq. 




was not morally able to annex the Strait s .l Quoting from 
him: 
"When I say 'morally' or 'spiritually' this is what 
I mean: to settle down in Constantinople as crusaders 
proclaiming the triumph of the Orthodox Church, is out of 
the question because of our Pan-Slevic sympathies and af- · 
filie.tions, and our dislike of the Greeks; to add to that, 
the moral authority of our clergy is hardly very high in 
the opinion of the Greek clergy. To play the part so bril-
liantly perfot•med by England in Egypt, we are utterly in-
capable. Then, what is going to happen if, by a decree of 
Providence, weobta1n possess i on of Constantinople and the 
Straits, etc.? Among other t h ings, we shall h ave against 
us the local population me.de hostile by our ba.ekward admin-
istrative methods and especi ally by our t reatment of the 
non-Russian subject s of the Empire; also Bulgar ia and Greeoe, 
who have quite determined views about t he Strai ts .t e.nd 
especie.lly about Constantinople; and then Rumania, whom 
we are trying to win on our ai de and who will oe hardly 
attracted by the rumors of our desire to settle down on 
the Bosphorus, which would. mean for her the impossibility 
of obtaining an outlet from the Black Sea., 11 2 · 
There were also those who thought that neutralization 
of the Straits under Russia would be a satisfactory solu-
./ tion of the problem, Russia could institute a regime like 
that obtaining at the Panama Canal, and in this manner she 
oould insure commercial freedom through the Straits to all 
the world.3 Still others accepted the principle of neutral-
ization without Russiru1 supremacy,4 M. Alexinsky, author 
of Russia and the Great War stated that in his estimation 
1. See above, p. 6. 
2. Prince Kudashev to Sazonov, February 11/24, 1915, Flor-
insky, M.T., ..2.E• cit., p. 113. 
3. Reich, quoted in Carriere della Serra, April 1, 1915, 
quoted in Phillipson and Bu..xton, ..2.E• cit., p. 210. 
4. Alexinsky, G., Russia and the Great War, Eng. trans., 
(London, 1915), p. 302~ quoted in Pllillipson and 
Buxton, ~· cit., p. 210. 
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the "'bes t s olution i s the neutra lization of the Stra it s 
EJ nd Constantinople; EJ.nd th:l t in the new adminintr c=;. tion to 
be set up conformably there to the Ba lkan States--Ruma nia , 
Bulga ria , Greece and Serbiu--ohould be allowed to partici-
pa te along with t he Grea t Powers.'"l In Paris the sugg e s -
tion wa s made th8. t the s ame rules be npplied to the Stra its 
tht:~ t ob t a in over the Stra its of l·b.g el lo.n, 11 'whereby no 
fortific a tions or milita ry works ar e to be ma inta ined or 
established, And as for Convtantinople, a n international 
sys tem like t:Q.a t of To.ng ier o , is sugg es te(i.'"2 A . J. Toyn-
, 
bee thought tha t Constantin ople a nd s urrounding territory 
should be set u p a s ~n inde penden t Sta te wi t h loca l auton-
omy, with an inte r na tiona l rr1ilit a ry a dministra tion, which 
should be under the gua rdians of one Power, preferably the 
United States. 3 Sir :rfldwin Pe E1.rs writing in the ~ Re-
view sta ted tha t the 11 a ltern8.tive to the p os s ession of Con-
sta ntinople a nd the two Straits by Russia ••• is that a small 
interna tiona lized State should b e crea ted, to which both 
Straits uhould belong , e nd of wh ich Consta ntinople should 
be the cap ita l •..• The sugg estion put forwa rd for a 
neutra lized Sta te is g enerPlly welcomed in England a nd 
1. Alex in sky, G., Rusrda a nd the QreR. t War, p. 303, quoted 
in Phillipson o.nd Buxton, .9.£. cit., p. 211. 
2. Aulneau, J., la Turkie et la Guerra, (Paris, 1915), 
p. 329, quoted in Phillipson andl31L"<ton, .2.12.· cit., 
pp. 219-220. 
3. Toynbee, A .J. , Nationa l i..:tY. e.nd the War, (I,ondon, 1915), 
pp. 364 et seq., quoted in Phillipson and Buxton, 
..Q.ll• cit., pp. 220-222 . 
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Fr ance.»l The clea re s t expre ss ion of op inion from the 
Da lkr".n Sta te s was ma de by H. Da scovi.ci, in his book L.1. 
Question du :B osphore et des Dardanell e£ , in which he p ro-
bably reflected the views of the Rumanian GovernmerJt. 
Coming from a small Sta te which ha s had to wa rd off 
encroa chments of her territory, Da scovici protested vig or-
ously against the propositi ori tha t the Stra its be assig ned 
to Rus s i a . Such a cti on would but be t he first step in 
Russia 's imperia listic pl a n t o gather in al l of the States 
bordering on the Black Sea ,2 It wa s not eoonomio reas ons 
that prompted Russia to. move toward the Stra it s , he cla imed, 
but the desire to crea te a va st .Asia tic Empire a nd to mak e 
Consta ntinople a second Rome. aPa rler plus cla ir n'est 
p a s possible: l a Rus s ie veut les de'troits, pa. rce que c'est 
le seule moyen d'imposer sa lois a ux petits Etats de 1' 
Europe sud-orienta l. 11 3 He states thn. t a s f a r a s economic 
intere s ts were concerned Rumani a wa s f a r more desirous of 
securing fr ee pa ssag e through the Stra its tha n Russia was, 
for the a nnua l export ation of Ru ssia's total ag ricultura l 
out put wa s only 20% while tha t of Rumania was 55%. 4 "Il 
1. Pea rs, E .. , "Fate of the Dardanelles, 11 Yale Review, N. S . . 
IV, p. 658, July, 1915. · 
2. Da scovici, N., I,a Q.uestion dt! ~ osphore et des Da rdanelles, 
p •. 289 .. 
3. "Speaking a s clea rly a s possible; Russia desires the 
Stra its, because tha t is the only means of imposing 
her l aws on the srna ll sta tes of South Ea stern Europe." 
Trans. by the present author. Ibid., p. 290. 
4. Ibid., p. 282 . 
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_,/ 
resulte done, en chiffres, que la Roumanie est presque 
trois fois plus inttress/e ' / que la Russie a un regime de 
'\ 1\ / '\ 
complete et sure liberte de navigation cormnerciale a tra-
les / vars detroi ts. · Et si 1 1 on ajoute a cela le fait qu' 
ella " la. Russia, d'autres ne possede pas, connne sorties 
vers le / me.rche mondial, la proportion est surpa.ssee. ttl 
For Rumanie., the unobstructed passage through the Straits 
was considered a matter of freedom and independence~2 It 
was a question of vital importance for al1 of the Balkan 
States to keep Russia from the Straits,2 Neutralization 
under Russian guarantee was not acceptable, for the Balkan 
States feared that Russian domination over the Straits 
would be very mu.ch different from England's control over 
the Suez Canal or that of the United States at Panama.3 
Smmning up his argument against Russia he suggested that 
"•. ,ces / "' / detroits de Constantinople doivent etre desormais, 
' ouverts a tous les navires de toutes les nations, en temps 
de guerra comma en temps de paix. 11 4 The attitude of the 
1. "It results then, in nu.mbers, that Rouma.nie. is almost 
/ three times more interested than Russia. in a regime 
of sure end complete liberty for connnercial naviga-
tion through the Straits. And, if one adds to that 
the fact that she does not possess, as does Russia, 
other opening13 to world trade, the proportion is far 
greater." Trans. by the present ·author. Ibid., p. 283. 
2. Ibid., p. 294. --
3. IbiU., p. 294. See also Phillipson end Buxton,~· ?it., 
-p. 231. 
4. " •.• these straits of Constantinople must be open, here-
after, to all the ship s of all the nations, in times 
of we.r as in times of peace:-" Trans. by the present 
author. Ibid., p. 292. 
-------~- -------·------
1? 
Balkan States was recognized in England at thia time also. 
111'Tei ther Rumania nor Serbia. 11 wrote Sir Edwin Pears, "has 
ever made any claims whatever to the possession of Constan-
tinople. But I believe that every Balkan State without ex-
ception would desire the constitution of a small interna-
tionalized State rather than the permanent occupation of 
the city by Russia.. To Rumania and Bulg{iLria in pa,rticular, . 
this occupation would be a constant menace. Fo~ Russia 
could only be in oo~nunioation with a capital on the Boe-
phorus by sea and would naturally desire land transit; 
thio she could not obtain for any practical purpose except 
by invading the territory of Rumania and Bulgaria •••••• if 
the small State already suggested were established, every 
Power on the Black Sea and on the Danube would have free 
navigation to the Aegean without dread · of the inter-Balkan 
rivalriee."l 
According to Phillipson and Buxton: "Whatever advo-
cates there may be of schemes for assigning Constantinople 
and the Straits to thia or that Power there is undoubtedly 
an overwhelming majority of opinion in favor of internation-
alization."2 In accordance with the conclusions to which 
they had come they outlined a plan whereby a system of inter-
nationalization under the collective guarantee of the Powers 
1. Pears, E., 2£· cit., pp. 660-661. 
2. Phillipson and Buxton, .Ql2.• cit., p. 215 .. 
r 
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would be instituted .1 They submitted a list of fifteen 
principles ba sed on the instruments governing the Suez 
and Panama canals for the regulation of navigation. The 
Straits were to be free and open on terms of entire equal-
ity to ships of war and commerce at a ll times.a Zones 
were to be erected surrounding the Straits which were to 
be immune from attack or othe r warlike operations for the 
purpose of insuring the prot ection of the Straits.3 In 
order to carry out the provieions as outlined, a perman-
ent international commio~ion to sit a t Constantinople was 
to be crea ted. This wa s to have the power to make addi-
tional regula tions for the purpose of facilitating navi-
. gation, policing the wa ters of the Straits, and in general 
insuring good order. The commission might be modelled on 
the same basis as the Danube commission.4 As for Constan-
tinople. it wa s to be constituted a free town to be placed 
under the joint protection of the Powers,5 and since Tur-
key had ·betrayed her solemn trust she 11 must withdraw from 
Consta ntinople and the Stra its territory and leave both 
to Europe to be made free a nd to be internationalized.6 
1. Ibid. , p •. 236 .. 
2. "'ibi'd., p. 239. 
3. Ibid., p. 241. 
4. Ibid., p. 241. 
---arid Lausanne 
5 . Ibid ~ , p •. 2 4 7 . 
6. Ibid., p. 249. 
\ 
cf. these suggestions with the Sevres 
settlements infra. Chaps. II and IV. 
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Germany Attempts to Separate Russia 
from the Allies 
In the meantime the war was proving to be a tremen-
dous strain upon Russia, which we.s in no condition to meet 
the modernly equipped German army. Bulgaria had joined 
the Central Powers in the middle of l915 1 thus making the 
Russian situation on the Eastern front more insecure. This 
action placed a serious obsta.ole before Russia's ad.vence 
toward Turkey. In fact General Alexeev reported to Sazon-
ov that it was impractical to consider any territorial 
expansion in any direction as long as so much of Hussian 
territory was held by the enemy. The main task at the time 
was the defeat of Germany,l 
Under such circumstances Germany made offers to Russia 
in an attempt to separate her from the Entente, In May 
von Jagov1 1 then the Minister fo1~ Foreign Affairs in Ger ... 
many, speaking of a possible rapprochement between Russia 
and Germany said that: 
11 Tous ici sont d'accord que la paix entre 1 1allemagne 
et la Russia est une question vitale pour les deux pays / A , / qu'unissent te.nt d'interets commerciaux et en realite au-
cunes divergences politi ques separent •••• La Russie ge.gner-
ait beaucou~ plus si elle faisait une bonne paix avec 1' 
allemagne meme dans la question des Dardanelles, que 1' 
all_emagne admet est une question de premi~re importance 
pour la Russia. On est convaincu ici, que 1 1 angleterre 
1. Prince Kudashev to Sazonov, February 5/18, 1916, Florin-
sky, M.T., ~· cit., p. 115. 
\ / 
voudra et insistera a avoir les coudees libres dens la Mer 
Noire, HU.trement dit, qu 1 el1e voudra y dominer, car ella 
se dit @tre 1la Ma1 tres se de la Mer'? Ce serait un grand 
danger si tm jour la Russia avait tme guerra avec l'Angle-
' terre •••• L1Angleterre vise a obtenir l'influence dominante 
A Constantinople et malgr( toutes ses promesses elle ne 
permet t re jame.is 'a la Rus s ia de prendre cette ville ou 
de la garder si la Russia 1 1 occupe."l 
With such promises and warning s Germany tried to bring 
Russia over to her side; if not to make war on her former 
A1J.1es, then to conclude a separe.te peace with Germany. 
"In e.ny oase, t h e chances of a separate arrangement 
w1tl.1 Russia were excellent in t he latter part of the sum-
mer of 1915 (1916)2 when Rus si a was in very serio~s mil-
itary difficulties e.nd the Czar had appointed the admitted-
ly pro-German Sturmer to the pr emiership •••• In the course 
of the surm:ner and in the early autumn, numerous delibera-
tions of a general charecter were carried on and terms 
considered; but all this took place privately among German 
diplomatists or extended onlYt to conversations between 
them and the Higher Command. •3 
1. "Everyone here is in accol"d that pee.ce between Germany 
and Russia is e. vital question for the two count ries, 
th~t unite so many commercial interests and in real-
ity, are not separated by political divergences. Rus-
sia would gain much more if she made a satisfactory 
peace with Germany, even in the question of the Dar-
danelles, which Germany admits is a question of great 
importance for Russia. Everyone hei•e is convinced 
that the English will wish and will insist upon having 
a full freedom in the Black Sea, in other words, that 
she will wish to dominate there, because she is said 
to be the "Mistress of the Sea". This would be a 
great danger if some day Russ,ia had war with England. 
England would e.im to obtain the dominating influence 
at Constantinople, and in spite of all her promises 
She will never allow Russia to take the city or to 
guard it if Russia occupies it." Trans. by the pre-
sent author. Von Jagow, Germ. min. for For. Affairs, 
reported to Czar Nicholas II by Maria Vasilchikova, 
May 27, 1915, Semennikov, V.P., Politika Romanovyki 
Nakanunie Revoliutsii, pp. 15-19, quoted in Golder, 
F. A. , ~. cit. , p. 45. 
2. F.A. Goluer•s-correction. 1916 is the correct date. 
3. Memoirs of the Cr9_w.P._ Prince of _germ~ny, p. 136-37, 
quoted in---crolder, F'.A., .£12• cit., p. 51. 
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However these chances were dissipated early in 1917 
by the Cze.r in a Special Order of the Day, 11 The time has 
not yet come: the enemy has not yet been expelled from 
the provinces which have been seized by him; Russia has 
not yet attained the aim created by · this war--the posses-
sion of Czar-grad (Constantinople) and the Straits ••• 11 1 
1. Nicholas II in a Special Order of the Day to the Army, 
December 25, 1916, (January?, 1917), Loumsky, A., 
Memoirs of the Russian Revolution, pp. 47-48, quoted 
in Golder, F.A., .££• ~~t.~-p.~ 
CHAPTER II 
To the End of the War 
While German attempts to draw Russia away from her 
allies failed, the Russian Revolutions of 1917 separated 
Russia from the Entente. With these revolutions came the 
overthrow of the Straits settlement. By a series ot well· 
pl~ed diplomatic victories Russia had gained the oonsent 
to annex Constantinople and the Straits. As far as the 
Allied Powers were concerned this problem was settled. But, 
when the radical wing of the revolutionists seized the Rus-
sien Government, the whole plan fell, leaving Constantinople 
and the Straits to be the pawn of the victorious armies, 
whoever that may happen to be. This chapter, then, will 
deal with the Russian renunciation of the Dardanelles, the 
Allied victory over the Central Powers and Turkey, and the 
resulting peace of victory imposed upon the Ottoman Empire. 
Russia Renounces her Claims over the Straits 
The first revolution that took place in Russia during 
. / 
the year 1917 replaced the Czarist regime by a Government 
founded upon Republican principles. The nations at war 
with Germany hastened to recognize the Provisional Govern-
ment Which was more compatible with the avowed principles 
for which war was being waged. Democracy had been allied 
with Autocracy in a war to "make the world safe for democ-







~ ..... , ... 
and democracy. 
While making many changes in domestic policy, the 
Provisional Government retained the Czarist foreign poli-
cies. Thus, we find the new foreign minister stating the 
platform. 
"In the domain of foreign policy, the Cabinet ••• will 
remain mindful of th~. international engagements ent~red · 
into by the fallen regime, and will honor Russia'$ word ••• 
She (Russia) will fight by their (Allies') side against the 
common enemy until the end without cessation and w~thout 
.f'al taring." 1 
The Bolshevist party becoming increasingly powerful, 
began exerting pressure upon tbe new government, especially 
in the realm of foreign affaire. This party looked for a 
complete overthrow of Czarist principles, foreign as well 
as domestic. Consequently, it was no.t very _long before 
Miliukov was turned out of office.2 
In a statement made to the publio foll9wing J:is fall 
from power Miliukov demonstrated his sincere devotion to 
11 Rus sis.' s Historic Mia sion. 11 He said t 
"I admit quite frankly, and stand firmly by it that 
the main thread of my policy was to get the Straits for 
Russia. I fought unfortunately in vain, against those who 
favored the new formula [no annexation, and no indemnity, 
and the right of self-determination adopted by the Provi-
sional Government with the fall of MiliukovJ, and that 
Russia should free the Allies from their obligations to 
help her secure sovreign rights over the Straits. I would 
say, and say it proudly, and regard it as a distinct ser-
vice to the country, that until the last moment that I was 
1. Miliukov, P. Min. of For. Affairs in the Cabinet of the 
Provisional Government. Note on foreign policy, March 
18, 1917~ Sack, A. J., The Birth of the Russian Democ-
racy. pp. 246-48. Golder;-F.A., ~· cit., p. 324. 
2. May 15, 1917. 
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in office, I did nothing which gave the Allies the right to 
say that Russia had renounced the Straits."l 
Though still maintaining its attitude towards the con-
tinuation of the war, the Provisional Government stated 
very definitely its war aims. On April 9, 1917, Prime 
Minister G. E. Lvov declared that " ••• the Provisional Gov-
ernment considers it to be its right and duty to declare at 
this time that the purpose of free Russia is not domination 
over other nations, or seizure of their national possessions, 
or forcible occupation of foreign territories, but the es-
tablishment of stable peace on the basis of the e.elf-deter-
mination of peoples. The Russian people does not intend to 
increase its world power at the expense of other nations. 
It has no desire to enslave or degrade anyone."2 
When the November revolution placed the government in 
still more radical hands, immediate peace was sought for 
all nations who were at war on the basis of the "new formula." 
The Soviet Government sent out invitations to all the bel-
ligerents in an attempt to stop the war~ The other nations, 
however, did not agree with the Russian viewpoint for vari-
ous reasons, and they continued the war without the Russian 
assistance on the Eastern front. Russia concluded a separate 
peace with Germany and her Allies, thus relieving the Allied 
Powers of any obligations towards Russia at the conclusion 
1. Miliukov, P. Speech to the Congress of the Cadet Party, 
22 May, 1917. Reich, no. 109, May 24, 1917. Golder, 
F.A., 2E• cit., p. 334. 
2. War Aims of the Provisional Government. Reich, no. 73. 
April 10, 1917. Golder, F.A., ~· cit., P• 329. 
~ .......... 
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of a general peace. 
Since Russia had renounced her rights and claims over 
the Straits in this rather indirect manner, the British 
Government aknowledged the Russian attitude and stated the 
British viewpoint in the ' following terms: 
" ••• we do not challenge the maintenan(}e of the Turkish 
race with its capital at Constantinople--t~e passage between 
the Mediterranean and the Black Sea being ~ntern~t1onalized 
and neutralized." 1 
Rise and Fall of War time Idealism 
With the Russian re'nouncement of the claims over the 
Straits and Constantinople there came a period when war aims 
were restated in terms of world idealism. The strongest 
evidence of this widespread democratic outlook was mani-
fested by the enunciation of the "Fourteen Points" of a 
permanent peace stated by President Wilson in his message 
to a joint session of Congress January 5, 1918. 2 This 
message flashed around the world, cr~ating widespread feel-
ing of democratic nationalism among all the nations of the 
world, particularly among the oppressed nationalities. 
President Wilson's statements were quite generally accepted 
by all the Allied Powers as being a clear definition of war 
1. Lloyd George, British Prime Minister, January 5, 1918. 
Cooks, F.S., ~· cit., p. 25. 
2. Scott, J. B., Official Statements of War Aims and Peace 
Proposals. p. 238. 
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aims. In fact with the exception of the Russian pr~nounce­
ments it was the only clearly stated group of aims. 
With respec.t to Turkey these statements were of great 
importance. Prior to the war and during the early years 
of the conflict there was a common feeling among the Gov-
ernments~ that whatever happened to Constantinople and the 
Straits. Turkey would have to quit Europe. As the years of 
the war passed, and the agresaive Imperialists became soften-
ed, the awing toward idealism recognized the rig~ts of other 
nations, and the position of Turkey in Europe b~came un-
challenged. The nations said with Wilson: 
"The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire 
should be assured a secure sovereignty, ••• and the Dardan-
elles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the 
ships of commerce of all nations under international guar-
anteea."l 
Consequently, before the war had come to an end the 
evidence seemed to indicate that Turkish sovereignty would 
be respected and that the Ottoman Empire would not lose ita 
capital. At the same time, however, it was generally accept-
ed throughout Europe and /~erica that a more satisfactory 
I 
regime should be provided for navigation of the Straits than 
had previously obtained. For, during the war when Turkey 
1. Scott, J~B., ~·cit., p. 238. 
2. See also statements by Prime Min. Lvov, and Lloyd George 
above. p. a4 and p. 25. 
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had shut off the supply of Russian grain and produce from 
Europe because of her control over the Straits, the prin-
ciple of "freedom of the Straits" bece.me more persistent. 
The Western Powers began to realize that this passageway 
was of such importance that it should not be subject to the 
control of a weak nation liable to the domination of a 
stronge_r Power. This position had just been clearly demon-
strated not only d~1ng the nineteenth century when England 
bolstered up the Sultan's Government and secured advantages 
because of her domination, but in the early days of the war 
when Germany influenced the TUrkish policy. 
In addition, this same spirit of idealism, which became 
increasingly stronger, fostered the principles of inter-
nationalism, which considered world important centers and 
thoroughfares as the heritage and property of mankind in-
stead of that of any particular national group. 
In the meantime the Allied e,rmies forged on in prose .. 
outing the war on all fronts • .. Turkey was gradually worn 
down till her resistance had all but vanished. Before she 
was entirely crushed, however, Turkey sued for an armistice, 
October 14, 1918, accepting the program enunciated by Pres-
ident Wilson's "fourteen points" as the bases for negotia-
tion.l 
In accordance with t:his request, a meeting was held 
and an armistice agreed upon and signed at Mudros, October 
1. Scott, J. B.,££· cit., p. 419. 
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31, 1918, between the Allied Powers and the Ottoman Empire.l 
Aside from concluding peace and making other demands, the 
armistice provided for the opening of the Dardanelles e.nd 
the Bosphorus with access to the Black Sea, together with 
provisions for the Allied occupation of the Dardanelles and 
Bosphorus forts.2 
A few days later British warships etean\$0. into the 
Sea of M~~mora and dropped anchor in front of Conetantinople, 
while an interallied force oocup1ed the city. In thie. manner 
the Powers gained a secure foothold for futu:re negoti~tions. 
Armies of occupation have usually served well dur~ng peace 
pe.rleys, and this instance proved to be no exception. 
Eleven days after the signing of the Mudros e.rmistioe 
the war on the western front was terminated and the world 
faced the tremendous task of reconstruction, 
By February 15, 1919, the Straits had been reopened to 
commerce by the War Trade Board through the action of the 
Supreme Economic Council in Paris. 
During this same year the Allied Powers met at Ver-
sailles in an attempt to bring peace to the world. In 
their anxiety to arrive at a settlement of the European 
question they totally ignored Turkey and the Straits ques-
tion. This delay in negotiating a near eastern peace was 
1. Scott, J. B., E£• cit., p. 419. 
2. Official Britisn paraphrase of the Mudros Armistice. 
The London Times. November 2, 1918, P• 7. 
_.. ... 
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fatal to the Allied cause. For, during the period follow-
ing the war the Sultan's Government at Constantinople suffer-
ed a temporary relapse. By this time the Moslems in Anatolia 
had become aware of the intentions of the Allied Powers to 
overthrow the principles of a permanent peace as outlined 
by Wilson. They realized that the Allies would probably 
divide among themselves the Turkish territories with a view 
to exploitation. 
This feeling quickly spread throughout the entire 
Mohammedan world. When it became known that the J\lliea 
planned to separate Turkey from her capital and depose the 
Sultan, the feeling increased. Great Britain wae most con-
cerned over this Moslem indignation, being the greatest 
Mohammedan Power. In India meetings were held denouncing 
this intended blow at the very heart of the Moslem power, 
for it must be remembered that the SUltan was ~ot only the 
head of the Ottoman Empire, but also the apex of the entire 
Mohammedan religious organization. 
This Pan-Islamic movement, though not centered in the 
Levant, gave strength and courage to the rising Nationalist 
leaders Who w~re heading the movement for a revival of 
Turkish nationalism centered in central Anatolia.l 
The dominating Mustapha Kemal.Pasha gathered together 
the Turkish National Assembly at Angora in 1919; the object 
1. Davis, Wm. s., ·A Short History of the Near East. p. 391 
and footnote.-
,.,... ... ~ .. 
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being to establish a truly national Turkish State separate 
from the time-worn Government of the Sultan and his minis-
ters sitting at Constantinople. Though not connected 
officiall y with the Sultan's Government this group had 
great influence upon Constant inople and its policies. How-
ever, the British warships in the Golden Horn had a greater 
influence, and the Sultan was not only maintained b';y- the 
inglish, but he was also dominat ed by them. 
As early as June 17, 1919, the Turkish delegation asked 
for national preservation on the Bosphorus,l But tbe ques-
tion remained undecided while the Peace Conference was try-
ing to settle other questions. As time went on, rumors were 
abroad that Constantinople was to be made a "free city" in 
an internationalized State at the Dardanelle~.2 The longer 
the Conference put off a decision, however, the stronger 
grew the nationalist movement. 
On January 5, 1920, the National Assembly at Angora 
passed the National Pact, pledging the members of the Assem-
bly to labor for the establishment of a free, sovereign 
nation. Article IV of that Pact declared that: 
"The security of Constantinople--the capital of Turkey 
and seat of the caliphate--and that of the Sea of Marmora 
must be sheltered from any attack. 
"This principle having been laid down and accepted, 
the TurkiSh Nation is ready to subscribe to any decision 
1~ Current Histori, Vol. X, p. 247. 
2. lbid, P• 530. 
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which may be t aken by common ag r eement between the Turki sh 
Government, on the one p~. rt, v1i th a view to ensurine; the 
opening of the Straits to world trade and to interna tiona l 
communications.»! 
Had the Allies rnnde an immedia te pea ce with Turkey they 
mi e;ht bave been able to dis pose of Const antinople a ccording 
to their own wishes, but the delay wa s costly. The Supreme 
Allied Council announced on Februa ry 15, 1920, tha t the 
Turkish Government would be a l l owed to rema in at Const an-
tinople. Turkei wa s to g ive a dequa te guarantees, howeve r , 
rela tive to the Stri its. The Allies were to mainta in a 
strict military and nava l control over the Stra its,2 
This decision met a good dea l of op position in Grea t 
Brit a in where many believed tha t the only method of safe-
gua rding the Straits wa s to rout the Turks out of Europe. 
It was cha rg ed tha t the British viceroy in India , fe a ring 
further trouble with Britain's seventy million Moslems, 
\ 
persuaded the Government to ins ist upon this move.3 Such 
a decision wa~ considered a huge s a crifice of British and 
world interest s for the s a tisfa ction of the Indian Moslems. 
On May 11, 1920, a draft trea ty wa s handed the Turkish 
delegation conta ining ma ny humilia ting and una ccep t able 
1. Article IV of the Turki sh 1:-a tiona l l)act of J anua ry 5 , 
1920; Current Histq_!'.;y_. Vol. ~~VII, :pp .. 280-281, No-
vember, 1922. 
2. Current History. Vol. XI, p. 435, March 1920. 
3. See for instance A. J. Toynbee, "Meaning of the Constan-
tinople Decision." New Euro_pe, Vol. XIV, p. 129, 
Februa ry 26, 1920; and "Mr. Montagu's Pound of Flesh" 








terms, hardly in ace ord with Wilson' s "Fourteen Points". 
The spirit of world idealism, so strong during the last 
years of the war, had not been able to survive. Great 
Britain, France, Italy, and Greece had nationalistic ambi-
tions in Turkey which were demanding recognition. 
The Turkish delegation presented a vigorous pr·otest 
to the Peace Conference, outlining their objections to the 
imposition of such terms and making suggestions more oo.m-
pat1ble with Turkish sovereignty,l But 11 tp the victors go 
the spoils," and with very few concessions the Treaty was 
approved by the Sultan's Government with the British war-
ships anchored near his palace. '\ The Treaty of Sevres was 
signed by the Allied Powers on August 10, 1920. 
The Treaty of Sevres and the Straits 
Territorially, Turkey was practically excluded from 
Europe being replaced by Greece;2 the rights of sovereignty 
over the city of Smyrna and hinterland were ceded to Greeoe;3 
the islands of Imbros, and Tenedos were ceded4 and other 
dispositions made with regard to ~lrkish territory not re-
lated specifically to the problem at hand. Greece under the 
treaty would have a position on the Straits, but was to 
accept for herself all the limitations place~ on Turkey for 
1. These will be discussed at 
2~ Art. 27, Treaty of Sevres. 
3. Art. 65-83. 
4. Art. 84. 
the beginning · of Chapter III. 
See also map, Appendix II. 
the freedom of the Straits.1 The Sea of Marmora and the 
Dardanelles were to remain Turki~h.2 
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Subject to treaty provisions, the rights and title of 
the Turkish Government over Constantinople were not to be 
affected and the Sultan was to be permitted to reside there 
and maintain the Turkish capital. However, if Turkey should 
fail to observe the provisions of the treaty, the Allied 
Powers reserveQ. tne ;ri~ht to modify those provisiqns and 
TUrkey was to ~ree to such disposition as might QO made.3 
tt'l'he navigation of the Straits, inclu(iing the Dardan-
elles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorua, shall in the 
future be open, both in peace and war, to every vessel of 
commerce or of war and to military and commercial aircraft, 
without distinction of flag. 
"These waters shall not be subject to blockade, nor 
shall any belligerent right be exercised nor any act of 
hostility be committed within them, unless in pursuan.ce of 
a decision of the Council of the League of Nations.•4 
In order to undertake further measures to insure the 
freedom of the Straits the Greek and Turkitth Governments 
in eo far as each was concerned, were to delegate to the 
Straits Commission the control of the waters between the 
Mediterranean mouth of the Dardanelles and the Black Sea 
mouth of the Bosphorus, and to the waters within three miles 
of each of these mouths; this authority could have been ex-
ercised on shore to such an extent as might have been nec-
essary for the execution of the duties assigned it.5 The 
1. Art. 38 .. 
4. Section 11 
2 .. Art. 27. 
Article 37 .. 
3 .. Art. 36 .. 
5. Art .. 38-39. 
_ .... 
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commission was to have been composed of representatives 
appointed by the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, 
Greece, Rumania, the United States "(if and when that Gov-
ernment is willing to participate)", Russia "(if and when 
Russia becomes a member of the League of Nations)", Bul-
garia and Turkey "(if and when the two latter States be-
come members of the League of Nations.)" Each was to ap-
point one representative and all were to have had two votes, 
except the representatives of Greece, Rumania, Bulgaria, 
and Turkey, who were to have had one vote each.l The com-
missioners were to enjoy diplomatic immunities within their 
sphere of authority and were to exercise the powers confe~red 
upon them in complete independence of the local authority. 
"It will have its own flag, its own budget, and its . separate 
organization. "2 The Commission was to be charged with "the 
execution of any works considered necessary for the improve-
ment of the channels or the approaches to harbours; the 
lighting and buoying of the channels; the control of pilot-
age and towage, the control of anchorages; the control nec-
essary to assure the application of the special regime pro-
vided for certain specified ports of international concern; 
the control of all matters relating to wrecks and salvage 
and the control of literage."3 In case the Commission 
should find that the liberty of passage was being interfered 
1. Art. 40. 2. 41-42. 3. Art. 43. 
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with, it was to inform the Allied representatives at Con-
stantinople who were to provide the occupying forces, which 
were to be maintained by the Powers acting in concert, in 
order to pre~ent any action being taken or prepared which 
might directly or indirectly prejudice the freedom of the 
Straits. These representatives were then to act in concert 
with the naval and military commanders of the said forces 
taking such measures as might be deemed neceesary. Similar 
action was to be taken by the representativea in the event 
of any external action threatening the freedom ot the Straits,l 
In order to facilitate the execution of its duties the Com .. 
mission was to be allowed to organize such special police 
forces as might have been deemed necessary, drawn so far 
as possible from the native population residing within the 
zone of the Straits, excluding the Greek islands of Lemnos, 
Imbros, Samothrace, Tenedos and Mitylene, The special police 
force was to be commanded by foreign police officers appoint-
ed by the Commission.2 In all matters relating to naviga-
tion within the Straits all ships were to be treated on 
terms of absolute equali ty3; and e.ll dues and charges imposed 
by the Commission were to be levied without discrimination.4 
The Commission was to have enjoyed power to acquire property 
or permanent works, raise loans, and levy dues,5 Certain 
sanitary functions formerly exercised by certain specified 
1. Art. 44 and 178. 
4. Art. 54. 
2. Art. 48. 
5. Art. 46. 
3. Art. 52. 
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organizations were to be discharged under the authority of 
the commission.l Provisions were made concerning the exer-
cise of jurisdiction.2 The transit of war vessels was to 
. be in conformity to the regulations set forth, in terms of 
the Suez Canal Convention signed at Constantinople October 
29 ,. 1888, providing for the 11a.ssage of veesels through the 
Suez Canal,.3 subject to the reservation that nothing was to 
limit the powers of a belligerent or belligerents acting in 
pursuance of a decision by the Council of the Lea.gue of 
4 Nations. 
For the purposes of guaranteeing the freedom of the 
Straits a demilitarized zone was provided for, including 
the Straits and littoral for several miles inland.5 Further, 
all works, fortifications and batteries within the zone and 
in the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothraoe, Tenedos, and 
Mitylene were to be disarmed and demolished.. The recon-
struction of these works or similar works was to be forbidden • 
The Allies were to have the power to prepare for demolition 
any existing roads or railways in the zone and islands which 
would allow for the rapid transportation of mobile batteries. 
The construction of such roads was to be forbidden. The 
Allies, France, Great Britain, and Italy, were to have the 
right to maintain in the zone and islands such military and 
air forces as might be considered necessary to prevent any 
1. Art. 46. 2. Art. 49-50. 
3. Art. 56-59. For Suez Canal Convention see J. B. Moore, 
A Dig of Int. Law. Vol. III, p .. 264-266. 
4. Art .. 60. 5 .. Art. 179. See map. Appendix II. 
action being taken or prepared which might prejudice the 
freedom of the Straits.l 
These provisions dealt with the regime that was to 
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have been established on the Straits. In addition to these, 
there were many other provisions in the peace treaty which 
were strongly opposed, especially those dealing with Turkish 
economic and financial control. 
Thus peace was to have been secured between Turkey 
and the Allied Powers. But by the time the treaty was 
signed in August of 1920, there was so much opposition to 
the treaty that the probabilities for its enforcement were 
very meagre. 
1. Art. 178. 
CHAPTER III 
" Turkey Repudiates the Treaty of Sevres 
" 
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The Treaty of Sevres was a peace forced by the victors 
upon the van qui shed, and, as is usually the case, many ob-
jections had arisen even befol"e it ha.d been signed. In 
fact one Turkish Cabinet fell over the issue of whether or 
not to accept the treaty. A new Cabinet had to be formed 
end a new Turkish delegation sent to Paris to "betray" 
Turkey. If the Sultan's Government opposed the signing 
of the treaty, it can only be imagined how inuch mo:re the 
Nationalist Government disapproved of the peace terms, 
The Turkish Government prepared a pamphlet stating its 
objections to the proposed treaty which was presented to 
the Paris Peace Conference July 8, 1920.1 Only the por•tion 
dealing with the Straits will be considered here. 
Objection we.s raised to the number of supposedly author-
itative bodies that were to be created for carrying out the 
terms of various sections of the treaty, 1bese bodies 
were to he.ve jurisdiction over portions of Turkish terri-
tory,2 First, there would be the Sultan and .his Govern-
ment at Constantinople in whom the rights and title over 
1. Delegation Propaganda, Paris Peace Conference, 1919, 
/ / Miscellaneous, Turkey. Observations generales pre-
sentees ~r la delegation Ot t omane K ~ Conf?rence 
de la ~~ July 8, 1920; ----·--- - - ---
2. Ib!a.-,-pp. 12-14. 
,_ .. 
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the territory were to be maintained; second, there was to 
be the Commission of the Stra.its in whom great powers of 
control and regulation were to reside; third, there were 
to be the military authorities commanding the Allied armies 
of occupation; fourth there we.s to be a sort of a delibera-
tive council composed of the military commanders mentioned 
and the diplomatic representatives of Fl'ance, Gree.t Br1 te,in, 
and Italy; fifth, there was to be the Inter-allied commis-
sion of control and Military organization; sixth., the Fi-
ne.nce Commission; seventb , the Council of the Public Otto""! 
man Debt, and last, the consular jurisdiotions,l 
These eight organizations having various amounts of 
jurisdiction would each be independent, The relationships 
that were to exist amongst them were very vague. Further 
the sovereignty that was to be possessed by each body was 
not clee.rly defined. 2 Under such conditions the sovereignty 
of the Ottoman Empire was to be restricted beyond bounds of 
necessity, Their work would be aimed against the sovereignty 
of the State which could not be allowed, according to the 
Turkish delegation. 
The next objection was ranged against the composition 
and duties of the Straits Commission. This body was set 
up for the express purpose of guaranteeing the internation-
alization of the Straits.3 In reality, so ran the Turkish 
1. Ibid., PP• 12-14. 
3. Ibid., p. 11. 
2. Ibid., p. 12. 
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argument, the Commission was to represent certain of the 
Powers to the exclusion of others.l It was not even to 
be representative of the League of Nations. Moreover, each 
of the principal rowers was to have two votes while the 
remaining States were to have only one each. 2 This would 
lead to an unequal amount of influence being exercised by 
a tew Powers. Such an arrangement was contrary to the 
principle of equality· among Stm.tes. 3 This unequally re-
presentative body wa1;3 to have ~ sort of e.n international 
judioal personality, without being a State, it was to have 
its own fle.g, its own budget, its O\~n organization and even 
its own legislative and administrative sphere,3 All of 
these attributes of statehood would place important limita-
tions and restrictions upon Turkish sovereignty and power,3 
This situation would surely make for numerous conflicts be-
tween the Turkish Government and this new regime,3 
Furthermore, the commission, which was to guarantee 
the internationalization of the Straits, was to allow the 
military occupation to continue its authority which was 
not to be an international authority.4 Instead, there 
were to be the military commanders, each representing his 
own particular State and subject to the.t State. 4 The dis-
position of the military and naval forces under him would 
be in the interests of his own State. This condition would 
1. Ibid., p. 12. 
3. Ibid., p. 12. 
2. Ibid., p. 11. 
4. Ibid., p. 13. 
be a source of conflict with the Turkish Government, the 
consequences of which might be of extreme gravity .. 1 
The Council of Representa tives of the occupying Powers 
would not confo~ to diplomatic usage.2, The diplomatic a-
gents accredited to the Sultan would be supposed to discuss · 
with the Straits Commission and with the Military commanders 
measures to be exercised against Turkey and even ag~inst 
other States in the attempt to preserve the freedom of the 
Straits~2 Such requirements would be incompatible with the 
duties of diplomatic agencies under international law.2 
All of these provisions which the peace treaty provides 
are quite obviously not in accord with the twelfth point in 
President Wilson's "fourteen points" and therefore unaccept-
able to Turkey.3 
The Turkish suggestion at this point was ·that the in-
ternationalization of the Straits could only be realized by 
means of an international organization founded on a judicial 
basis and represented by all of the States. 4 The League of 
Nat ions would be entirely qualified to assure the realizo.-
tion of such an organization .. 4 This could be done by del-
egating a high neutral Comrn issioner. 4 
Turkey objected to the proposed demilitarized zones 
because they were far too large. 5 It would be to the benefit 
1 ... Ibid .. , p .. 13. 
3. Ibid.' pp .. 13-14. 
5 ... Ibid., pp. 14-15 .. 
2. Ibid., P• 13 .. 
4 .. Ibid., p. 14 .. 
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of the Straits regime if the· zones would be reduced to 
such size as would be absolutely necessary for the .assur-
ing of the freedom of the straits.l A much smaller zone · 
was therefore suggested.! 
Turkey agreed to the provisional occupation of Otto-
man territory so long as trouble existed in Asia Minor, 
but as soon as order was n1aintained tbe ne ed of oooupation 
would be at an end.2 Unt il that time the ~e troops on Tur-
kish soil would continue to be a direct t h reat at Turkish 
sovereignty.2 
In regard to the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, 
Tenedos, and Mity1ene, their possession by Turkey was con-
sidered necessary for the maintenance of that freedom of 
the Straits which was so nrucb desired.3 
Turkey even agreed not to have any fortified works on 
the shores of the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles or the Sea. of 
Marmora within a smaller demi litarized area such as suggested 
by Turkey.4 Turkey was quite willing to accept all res-
trictions of her sovereignty which were necessa_ry for the 
assurance of the liberty of n avigation within the Straits.5 
But restrictions beyond that point, became threats.5 
Especially during war time it was necessary for Turkey 
to have more freedom of action in order to safeguard the 
1. Ibid., pp. 14-15. 2. Ibid ., P• 15. 
3. Ib-id:., p . 15 . 4. Th_fci. , p. 15. 
5. Ibid., p. 15. 
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Straits and to protect her cBpital and territories.l She 
wished to have the auth01~i ty to admit or deny entrance of 
warships into the Dardanelles or Bosphorus.2 This could 
be done in conjunction with the Straits conunission; such 
~ disposition of authority would be more in keeping with 
the principle of equality.3 In this manner both Turkey 
and the Allies would be protected, 
To attain this equita.ble 1"egime for tne Stl:'aits which 
all desired, the Turkish delegt:ttion suggested tnat regula-
tions be drawn up similar to those governoiting the Suez _ 
Canal as embodied in the Treaty of Constantinople o;f 1888.4 
Such an agreement would not only insur•e Turkish sovereignty 
over the Straits but would place upon Turkey the obligation 
to guarantee and maintain freedom of transit therein. 
Thus ended the Turkish objections and proposals which 
concerned the Straits, But the Turks were not the only 
" ones who were dissatisfied with the settlement of Sevres, 
Although the Allies had agreed to the terms of the peace 
there were objections raised in severa.l of the countries, 
France fea.red that Great Bri te.in was using Greece to further 
English interests in the eastern Mediterranean ar•ea at the 
expense of French intere sts. France was willing to resort 
1. Ibid., pp. 15-16, 
2. Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
3, Ibid., p. 15. 
4. Ibid., p. 16. For Convention of 1888, see Moore, J .B. 
--x-Digest of International Law, III, pp. 264-266. 
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to almost any means in order to safeguard her prestige in 
this area. Italy was perturbed because of the great gains 
" that Greece had made at Sevres. Greece had been accorded 
large amounts of Turkish territory, largely through the in-
fluence of Great Britain, and it wa s to Italy's best inter-
ests to keep Greece from becoming a rival in the Mediterran-
ean region. In Russia dissatiafa ction was found with the 
trea ty, because Russ ia. was not given sufficient guarantees 
for the safety of he r southern littoral. lt w~s pointed 
out that unless all warships were permanently excluded 
from the Straits and the Black Sea , Russia's southern riv-
age of 2.230 kilometres would be laid open to attack.l 
Such an arrangement would be quite unacceptable to Russia. 
In England there were a few who believed that the treaty 
was too light a punishment for Turkey~ ?urkey should have 
been driven out of Europe, they thought. 
" Under such very unfavorable conditione the ~evres 
Treaty was expected to be enforced . The Sultan's Govern-
ment would not ratify the treaty and the Nationalists utter-
ly repudiated it. None of the Powers were willing to under-
take the task directly. Unfortunately, Greece attempted to 
enforce the peace terms.2 She wa s not without some aid and 
1. Statement of the Russian unofficial delegation at the 
Paris Peace Conference, July 5, 1919, Miliukov, P.¥., 
Russia rr:oday and Tomorrow, p. ~8 .. 
2. "Greece Attempts to Impose the Sevres Treaty," Current 
History, XIV, :pp. 347-48, J-aay, 1921. 
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encouragement, however, for Britain supported Greece in 
her attempt~ Despite Englandts help, Greece was in no way 
prepared for the undertaking. 
France and Italy . deaerted Great Britain at about this 
time, turning to the aid of Tur~ey~l With the many jeal-
ousies dividing the Powers, the need for a complete revision 
of the s'evres settlement was readily recognised. At the 
London Conference on Near :Eastern Affairs d~ring the early 
months of 1921, a provisional program was drawn up whereby 
a revision of the peace terms might be acoomplished. The 
Supreme Council invited Greece, and the two groups2· in 
Turkey to the parleys.3 The two Turkish delegations, each 
with practically the same instructions, came to the Con-
ference well prepared to defend the interests of their State.4 
The proposals which were finally made by the Supreme 
Council w.i th a view toward modification of the treaty were 
published in a British statement issued on March 12, 1921, 
saying in effect that the Allies would pledge their Gov-
ernments to aid Turkey in gaining admission to the League 
of Nations, as soon as Turkey gave proof of her readiness 
to carry out the modified treaty.5 The Allies agreed to 
1. See infra, p. 47~ 
2. The Sultants Government at Constantinople and the Nation-
alist Government at Angora. 
3. The London Conference met from February 21, to March 12, 
1921. "Revising the Turkish Treaty," Current History, 
XIV, p .. 176, April, 1921. 
4. Ibid~, u. 178. '\ 
5. "Greece-Attempts to Impose the Sevres Treaty," Cur. Hist .. , 
XIV, p .. 348. 
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withdraw the threat of Turkish expulsion. from Constantin-
ople; to give to Turkey the chairmanship of the Straits 
Commission, to give her two votes instead of one in the 
Commission; and to allow Turkey to increase her gendarmerie.l 
The Powers would be willing to reduce the demilitarized 
zones more in keeping with the Turkish desires. These mod-
ified zones would include the Gallipoli Penninsula, and the 
coast of Marmora up to Rodosto; on the Asiatic coast of' the 
Dardanelles, from Karabigha on the Sea of Marmora to a 
point on the Aegean Sea neer the island of Tenedos; on the 
two shores of the Bosphoru.s to a depth of from 121t to 16 
miles inland; and the islands commanding . the entrance to 
the Dardanelles in the Aegean and Marmora Seas ,2 Further-
more, the Allies would also consider the evacuation of 
Constantinople and the Ismid Penninsula, thus limiting the 
inter-allied occupation to the Gallipoli Penninsula and to 
Chanak.3 The maintenance of Turkish troops in Constantin-
ople and uninteri'upted passage of Turkish t roops over the 
demilitarized e.reas at the Bosphorus was conceded. 4 Certain 
financia.l s.nd territorial concessions would be considered 
also,5 Greece was to continue to maintain a garrison in 
Smyrna.6 
1. Ibid., P• 348. · 
2. IDIU., P• 348. See map, Appendix III. Compare these 
-zones with those of the s'evre s and Lausanne set t lements. 
3. Ibid., p. 348. 4. Ibid., P• 348. 
5. Ibid., p. 348. 6, IbiQ., p. 348. 
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Turkey accepted all of the proposed modifications ex-
cept the one dealing with the continuance of the Greek 
garrison in Smyrna. Greece, on the other hand, rejected 
the proposa.l s in toto .1 
On the twenty-four t h of Me.rch 1921, Greece initiated 
a vigorous drive age.inst the Natione.list forces in Anatolie_ 
in an e.ttempt to force the 'l1r eaty of s·evx•es upon Turkey. 2 
The chances for Greek success, were prejudiced, hov1ever, 
before the Greek army be gan its offensive, F're.nce and 
Italy had already openly sympathized with Turkey in her 
attempt to secure modification of the peace terms, and by 
the middle of March both Italy and France had signed treaties 
of peace with Turkey,3 
The very day on which the Allied Powers had submitted 
the proposed modifications to Turkey, Italy and Turkey 
signed a peace treaty wherein the Government of Italy pledged 
itself '' ••• to support effectively in relations to its Allies 
all demands of the Turkish delegation relative to the Peace 
Treaty, and especially restitution to Turkey of Smyrna and 
Thrace. 11 4 
The treaty between France end Turkey wa.s more general 
in its terms than the Italo-Turkish convention, the former 
1. Ibid., p. 347. 
2. Ibid., P• 347. 
3. Montgomery, G.R., "Secret Pacts of F'rance and Italy With 
Turkey," Current History, XIV, p. 203, May, 1921. 
Contains texts. 
4. Ibid • , p • 20 5 . 
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being a 11 general" peace treaty between tbe two countries. 
As a result of the treaty several thousand Nationalist 
troops were released from the Cilician front, which France 
had been defending , and transferred without delay to the 
Graeco-Turkish lines , l 
Because of the actions of France and Italy the situ~­
tion within the Entente bec~e very critical. Gre a t Bri-
tain was opp osed by Fr ance and Italy with regard to the 
"Near Eastern" question,2 and mutual jealousies had arisen 
between France and Great Britain in. Europe in l'espect to 
the German and Polish settlements. 3 Turkey, running true 
to form, used the European quarrels to f.u:rther her own 
ends, With France and Ita:ly avowedly sympathetic with the 
Turkish cause, and definitely lending their aid to Turkey, 
Greece was impotent, especially since Great Britain gave 
nothing more than "moral support 11 to the Greek cause, 
Under these distressing circmnstances the Greek cam-
paign in Asia Minor wa s doomed to failure, and added to 
the advante.ge gained by a rift in the Entente, an invasion 
of the Turkish homeland by Greece made it all the more 
1. Ibid., p. 203-204. 
2. Simonds, F.H., "Anglo-French Disputes," American Review 
of Reviews, .LXIV, p. 259. 
3. IbN., p. 260- 261. A full discussion of' these conflict-
---rn:g Imperialistic policies is out of place in this 
paper; the accounts in the periodicals of that period 
are quite interesting . See especially, Simonds, F.H., 
.£12.• cit., pp. 259-267, and Gibbons, H.A., 11 F'reedom of 
the Straits," Asia, XXII, pp. 994-98. 
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certain that Greece would have to capi tula.te in Asia Minor. 
However, these conditions, two Allied note s , and some 
Gre ek reverses, could not deter Constantine from planning 
a bold stroke calcul a ted to restore srnne of Greece's lost 
prestige. According to his program, Smyrna wa s to be de-
clared an autonomous State under Greek protec t ion, this was 
to be followed by a march on Constantinople with the aim 
in view of Greek occupation of thD.t city.l 
The Allies promptly forbade the carrying out of this 
plan in the same fash ion that an e arlier attempt to block-
ade the Straits by Greece was opposed.2 The continued 
opposition of the Allie s to the Greek plans undoubtedly 
affected the final outcome of the "Near Eastern" question, 
at the same time this opposition served as a good alibi for 
the Greek reverses in Asia l~inor. 3 
For about a year the situation remained virtually un-
changed in Anatolia except for a short period of Greek 
successes, wherein the Greek troops threatened the Nation-
aliststcapital, Angora. However, during the last week of 
August, 1922 , the Kemalists started a surprise attack on 
the Greek lines concentrating on the we akest point, along 
the Afiun-Karahissar front.4 An overwhelming victory for 
1. Polyzoides, A.T., "The Greek Collapse in Asia Minor," 
Current History, XVII, p. 33, October, 1922 ~ 
2. "Greece in New Difficulties," Current Histor;z:, XIV, 
p. 518, June, 1921. 
3. Polyzoide s , A.T., ~· cit., pp. 35-36. 
4. "The Turkish Triumph Over Greece," Current History, 
XVII, p. 161, October, 1922 . 
50 
the Turkish forces resulted. The Greek army and civilian 
population fled before the Turkish advance, fearing a 
massacre. The drive continued on towards Smyrna, which 
city was occupied by the Nationalists, September 9.1 On 
the previous day the city had been turned over to the Allied 
authorities by the Greeks. 
The Greeks made f~antic appeals to the A1liee, oalling 
for an armistice, for Greece was in danger of loa1Pg all 
that she possessed in Aaia Minor and possibly in Tn~$Oe,2 
An armistice at this time was oompletely out of ~he range 
of possibility on account of the Turkish e.ttituqe, Turkey, 
now flushed with success, would not listen to any terms 
which would leave Greece in Asia Minor or Thrace,3 Turkey 
had the support of France and Italy in this respect. 
Since an armistice was evidently impossible, the Greek 
rout continued, and the Greek forces fled across into Thrace, 
which was still held by the Athens Government, An extremely 
critical situation arose e.t this · point, for the Kemalist 
forces were determined to cross the neutralized zones of 
the Straits in pursuit of the Greek army, which the Nation-
alists hoped to drive out of Thrace. The regaining of this 
territory was one of the pledges contained in the Turkish 
National Pact of 1920.4 But Great Bri tedn was just as 
1. Ibid., P• 161. 2. Ibid., p. 161. 
3. 'lrTfie New Turkish Crisis", Curren1?,_ ~_!._story, XVII, p. 184, 
November, 1922. 
4. Text in Current History, XVII, pp. 280-281. 
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determined to prevent any violation of these neutral zones; 
if necessary force would be used to preserve the neutrality 
of the Straits .1 
France, backed by Bulgaria and Rumania tried to dis-
suade Britain from using force to prevent the pursuing Kem-
alists from crossing the Straits. The French suggestion 
was that only diplomatic means should be used.2 
In the meantime the Greeks in Thre.ce prepared to de-
fend their rights under the Treaty of Sevres by amassing 
men and material in that region, Turkey, atill preparing 
to follow the Greeks, began to close in on the British 
forces, which were concentrated at Chanak near the entrance 
of the Dardanelles on the Asiatic side.3 Higply incensed 
at the British attitude, the Nationalists oondenmed Eng-
land because of her interference in Turkey. claiming that 
the so-called "neutralization" of the Straits was nothing 
less than British contro1,4 But Great Britain was not to 
be shaken by Turkish threats, and on September 15, the Bri-
tish Government with French approval informed Kemal that 
the neutrality of the Straits must be respected.5 In res-
ponse Mustapha. Kemal declared that the Allies should pledge 
themselves to the return of Thrace to Turkey. Nationalist 
troops were then concentrated at Ismid on the extreme eastern 
1. "The New Turkish Crisis", Cur. Hist., XVII, P• 184. 
2. Ibid., p. 184. 3. --r5id7;I:}. 184. 
4. ~., p. 184. 
5. Ibid., p. 184. 
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end of the Marmora, while a Turkish force continued to ad-
vance toward the British entrenchment at Chanak. The send-
/ ing of Gener e.l PelJ.e, the French High Conunissioner to Smyrna 
in order to try and influence Kemal to adopt a more modera.te 
policy failed of its purpose.l 
In Ene;land, Lloyd George prepared and sent a note to 
Rumania, Jugoslavia, and Greece calling on them to aid 
Gre at Britain in he~ t ask of pre serving the. neutrality of 
the Straits. The same appe al was made to the British do-
minion s , which evinced more enthusiasm, Th.e protection of 
the Straits, ran the statement ''~ •• involved not only Bri-
tish interests, but European interests in gener-al, and 
world interest s of the first order. The permanent freedom 
of the Straits, ••• was a vital neriessity. If that were 
given up ••• all the r e sults of the victory over 1'urkey in 
the World War would have been destroyed."2 In support of 
this attitude the entire British Atlantic fleet was dis-
patched to the Dardanelles to aid the English force at 
Chanak, which was also reinfo"rced with additional troops 
and heavy artillery, preparatory to mee ting the 'J.urkish 
advance.3 
In the meantime, Lord Curzon had gone to Paris in an 
attempt to secu:r·e French approval for the British program. 
1. Ibid., p. 184. 
2. Paraphrase of the British official stat ement, ibi~., p. 
185. 
3. Ibid., p. 185. 
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But, on September 19, Premier Poincare, with the cabinet's 
backing , advised the British to withdraw from Chanak, In 
return fo1• this concession, e.ccording to the French plan, 
Kemal was to give a guarantee not to attack the neutral 
zones~ Furthermore, France, Italy, and Great Britain were 
to consent to the return of Thrace to Turkey; and Kemal was 
to consent to the continued freedom of the Straits, giving 
assurances in this respect. Turkey was also to consent to 
the establishment of an international comm~ssion of _control 
for the Straits,! But when it was learned that Turkey de-
manded an immedia t e evacuation of Thrace before terms would 
be considered, the inter-Allied conference adjourned with-
out coming to an agreement, and on September 21, the British 
Government categorically refused to withdraw her troops 
from Chanak, even though the F'rench and Italian troops had 
been withdrawn from the zone,2 General Harrington, Bri-
tish commander of the Allied forces, assured Turkey that 
England did not want war with Turkey, but to no avail, for 
the Nationalist forces continued to close in on the British 
at Cha_nak. 3 
On September 23, the British succeeded in reuniting 
the Entente on a single program of activities in the Near 
East. Fre.nce and Ite.ly, finally realizing the seriousness 
of the situation, created partly by their efforts, agreed 
1. Ibid., p. 186. 
3. Ibid., p. 186. 
2. Ibid., p. 186. 
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to the sending of a joint note with Britain to Mustapha 
• 
Kemal. 1 The Powers invited Turkey to send delegates to a 
peace conference to conclude · a final peace with the Allies. 
They made known their assent to the reestablishment of 
Turkey in Thrace as far as the Maritza river, including 
Adrianople. "On condition that the Angora Government does 
not send armies during the peace negotiationa into zones, 
the provisional neutrality or which has been proola:l.med by 
the Allied Governments, the three Governments will willingly 
support at the Conference attribution of these frontiers to 
Turkey, it being understood that steps will be taken in 
common agreement in the t reaty to safeguard the interests 
of Turkey and her neighbors, to demilitarize, with a view 
to the maintenance of peace in certain zones to be fixed, 
to obtain peaceful, and orderly re-establishment of Turkey's 
authority, and finally to assume effectively, under the 
League of Nations maintenance of the freedom of the Dardan" 
elles, the Sea of Marmora and Bosphorus, as well as protec-
tion of religious and racial minorities." 
The Allies are in agreement " ••• in reaffirming their 
assurance ••• that they will withdraw their troops from Con-
stantinople as soon as the treaty of peace has entered into 
force." 
"The three Allied Governments will use their influence 
to procure before the opening of the conference the retirement 
1. Ibid., p. 186. 
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of the Greek forces to a line to be fixed by the Allied 
Generals in agreement with the Greek and Turkish military 
authorities.• 
"In return for this intervention the Government of 
Angora will undertake not to send troops, either before 
or during the peace conference, into the zones of neutral-
ity which have been previously declared and not to cross 
the Straits or the Sea of Marrno:ra. 111 
The results of this Conference were very important, 
chiefly because Entente unity had been ac~ieved.. Turkey·' s 
strongest weapon, division and jea lousy among th.e Powers, 
vvas removed. The crisis had not been passed, however, for 
the Turks continued to advance toward the British strong-
hold at Chanak. General Harrington demanded the withdrawal 
of the Kemalist troops from the zones and on September 29, 
Turkey refused to quit that area.2 The two opposing forces 
Ylere separated by about ten miles and 'both were prepared 
for conflict when the Nationalist reply to the Allied joint 
note of September 23, was received on October 3. 
The Turks accepted the proposals for an armistice and 
peace conference on condition that Constantinople and Thrace 
be ceded to Turkey. Turkey for her part would consent to 
/ 
the establishment of some sort of a satisfactory regime of 
1. Joint note from the Allied Governments to Turkey, Sep-
tember 23, 1922, text in Current History, ibid., p. 
187. 
~. Ibid~, p. 188. 
. ....... 
the Straits. In this respect, however, Russia must be 
1 allowed to state her views. 
The Nationalist forces were then withdrawn and all 
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further military movements were suspended, and the situa-
tion was somewhat relieved. On October 5, the Armistice 
meeting began and the negotiatio11s continued until the 
eleventh of the month when an agreement was reached. The 
Armistice of Mudania provided for the evacuation of Thrace 
by Greece within thirty days. Turkey lvas then to occupy 
the territory. The Angora Government promised to withdraw 
all Turkish troops from the zone of Allied occupation, and 
new neutral zones in the Chanak a nd Ismid areas were to be 
defined by a mixed commission. The Allies would bring in 
no new forces, and would not construct fortifications on 
the Straits. The Turks agreed to respect the neutral zone 
until the Allied withdrawal. The Angora Government bound 
itself not to transport troops into Eastern Thrace nor to 
raise or maintain an army there until the final ratifica-
2 tion of the pea ce terms. 
As many of the terms of the armistice as were possible 
of execution at the time were carried out. On October 26~ 
invitations to a peace conference to convene at Lausanne, 
Switzerland, November 13, were issued by France, Italy and 
1. Paraphrase of the Turkish reply, ibid~, p. 188-89. 
2 .• Paraphrase of the Mudania Armistice, signed. October 11, 
1922,. "The New Turkish Crisis," Current 1{istory, XVII, 
pp. 192, November, 1922. 
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Great Britain to the United Sta tes, Greece, Rumania, Jug o-
slaviD. , Japan and the two Governments in Turkey.l Russia , 
a nd Bulgaria were invited to send representatives to dis-
cuss the Straits problem o'nly .2 
New developments a rose when announcement was made, on 
/ / 
November 1 ,. of the deche~. of the Sultan and his Govern-
ment. In place 6f the Constantinople Government the People's 
a nd Peasants' Government was proclaimed the sovereign power 
in Turkey with authority vested in the Nati9nal fH113en1bly 
a t Angora~ The authority of the Sult an 's G9vernment wa s 
re pudia ted.3 In a note tendered to the French Foreign 
Office November 3, all treaties neg otiated by the Govern-
ment e~ t Consta ntinople since Iv~rch 16, 1920, were forma lly 
and officia lly repudiated.4 This of course included the 
Trea ty of Sevres. 
On November 5, 19 ;_~2, the Nationalists took over the 
city of Consta ntinople a nd ordered the Allied troops to 
eva cua te the city; to g ive up the control of the customs, 
of the police force and of the r a ilways; e.nd to abolish the 
mixed courts. They dema nded tha t only one. Allied ship be 
allowed to enter any Turkish port within the Straits a t 
one time. Other demands making for increa sed Turkish 
1. The Sultan's Government at Constantinople and the Angora 
Government·-
2. "Turkey," Current History, XVII, p .. 521, December, 1922. 
3. Ibid., P• 521. 




sovereignty in the city were made.l 
The Allied Governments had no other recourse than to 
recognise the fait ~ccompli~ But, although they realized 
that the Angora Government was supreme in Turkey, the Allied 
Commissioners refused to comply with the Nationalist de-
mands, being supported by their respective Governments in 
tf!,is regard.2 
It might be aEA.;I.d, in ps.sDins that the Turk~~h lfa.t;ion-
alist movement which began in 1goa had at last achieved 
s~ccess. Furtherrnor~ the obnoxious Treaty of S~vrea which 
whittled away most Of the Ottoman Empire wae abrogated and 
a new Turkey representing the people was ready to negotiate 
terms of peace on a basis of equality. 
During this very critical period the neutrality of the 
Straits was menaced on several occasions. It was through 
the efforts of Great Britain mainly that their neutral 
status was successfully maintained. There may have been 
an opportunity for England to have remained on the Straits 
nnd in Constantinople as she has at Gibraltar, but she was 
true to her pledge of seeking only to secure the freedom of 
navigation of the Straits under international guarantees. 
The Lausanne Conference was called for November 13, 
but because of the disagreement between the Allies the 
1 •. "Turkey," Cur. Hist., XVII, p .. 521 •. 




sessions did not open until the twentieth of the month. 
At the insistence of Great Britain, the Allies first met 
among themselves and arrived at a common agreement before 
the official sessions began. In this manner, they were 
able to present a united front on the main problems involved. 
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CHAPTER IV 
The Tres.ty of Lausanne and the Straits 
The Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern affairs began 
its labors in the afternoon of November 20, 1922. The 
countries represented were; the three inviting Powers, 
England, France, and Italy; Japan, Rumania, Jugoslavia, . 
Kingdom of Serbs-~Oro~ta and Slovenes, Grt~Qe and Turkey, 
I 
Russia Ukraine, Georgia, and Bulgaria were in attendance 
only for the discussions relating to the Straits, The 
United Ste.te s was represented by an "unofficial qbeerver 11 1 
the Government being unwilling to enter into the work of 
the Conference offiaie.l:iy. 
The problems to be settled were many, varied and of 
undoubted difficulty, It is no wonder that the Conference 
failed once, before it finally finished its task of bring" 
ing peace to the Near East, 
In dealing with the work of the Conference only the 
outstanding proposals, counter-proposals and objections 
will be considered before taking up the actual settlement. 
In general there were two opposing views presented and 
maintained throughout the negotiations. Strangely enough 
these two views were held by Great Britain on the one hand, 
and by Russia on the other. Since 1914 each of these two 
Powers had witnessed a complete rever sal of policy in res-
peat to their interests on the Straits. , It will be remembered, 
l 
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that prior to the Russian revolutions in 1917, the attitude 
of Russia had been for an opening of the Straits to war-
ships, especially her own. Great Britain, on the other 
hand, had by dint of much labor, successfully opposed Rus-
sian aims in this direction by bolstering up the weak gov-
ermnent of the Sultan from time to time throughout the 
nineteenth end early part of the twentieth century. England 
had continually insisted upon the rule of closure of the 
Straits to all warShips, 
During the World War, however, Great Britain learned 
just exactly what the closure of' the Straits really meant, 
for in this instance, it cut off the valuable Shipments of 
foodstuffs from Russia that were so necessary to English 
existence, England then, was prepared to keep the Straits 
free and open at all times in peace and in war, so that 
there would be no danger of a calamity, such as the stopping 
of all trade through the Straits, being repeated, 
Russie. on the other hand, since the change of Govern-
ment from that of the Czar to that of the Proletariat, was 
ready to shut off all warships from coming into the Black 
Sea where they might menace her frontier. The proletarian 
Government of Russia had a super sensitiveness regarding 
foreign affairs. Wherever the Russian representatives went 
they feared capitalistic imperialism, which they believed 
was pressing in on them from all sides. Under these circum-
stances it is little wonder that Russia was determined to 
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keep the Black Sea free from foreign warships. 
The other Powers of · V/estern Europe were just as fright-
ened by the words~ "World Revolution" as Russia was afraid 
of the word "Imperialism". Consequently there was a feel-
ing of mutual distrust of each otherts motives when the 
Conference began. In general the Powers aligned themselves 
in this fashion; Russia at the extreme left, Turkey in the 
center, and England and the other Powers at the extr,~e 
right ... 
The question might be asked why did the other littoral 
Statee of the Black Sea area follow the. lead of the Allies 
instead of following that of Russia? Would they not gain 
more by leaving the Black Sea free from foreign warships? 
They thought tha t Russia's renuncie.tion of imperialistic 
tendencies was merely a gesture. Even if it were not, the 
doctrine of world revolution was just as odious~ If foreign 
warships were excluded from the Stra~ts and the Black Sea, 
these riverain States would be liable to the complete dom-
ination of Russia, whom they fenred. 
As for Turkey, it was clear that she favored the Rus-
sian viewpoint, but owing to Allied pressure during the 
days following the war~ Turkey had been forced, on many 
occasions, to accept the principle of freedom of the Straits, 
with the resulting restrictions of her sovereignty. In 
consequence of her numerous pledges to respect this prin-
ciple in return for Allied concessions, Turkey was in no 
position to renounce her committments. 
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Proposals Reg~rding the Regime of the Straits 
~ 
The general terms of the Allies' proposals fell under 
two heads; "(1) regulations for the passage of vessels, 
whether of peace or war, through the Straits; (2) the cre-
ation of demilitari~ed zones on the shores of the Straits ••• nl 
In framing the proposals, the Allies had as their ob-
jectives the permanent factors involved in the problem. 
These factors may thus be described: 
''1. The primary interest in theae waters fpom the point 
of view both of economic life and security against attack, 
of the littoral States of the Black Sea, both great and 
small, e,nd the necessity of giving equal consideration to 
the interests of all those States. 
11 2. The character of the Dardl..'melles, the Sea of 1\l!ar .. 
mora and the Bosphorus, e.s an international highway for the 
commerce of the world between two international seas, and 
the necessity, therefore, of treating it, as far as possible, 
in the same manner as other international waterways, whether, 
rivers, Straits or canals, with a view to assure the free-
dom of peaceful commerce. 
11 3. The existence of the Capital of Turkey and th~ 
seat of the Caliphate on the shores of this waterway." 
In order to realize these principles the Allies pro-
posed the following rules for navigation of the Straits: 
"1. As regards ships o:( .9.9_l1J!!Lerce, there will be com-
plete freedom of navigation whatev~r the flag and the cargo.~. 
in time of peace, and in time of war, when Turkey is neutral. 
In time of war, when Turkey is belligerent there shall be 
complete freedom of navigation for neutral vessels, pro-
vided no assistance is given to the enemies of Turkey. 
1. Lord Curzon, President of the Territorial and Military 
Commission December 6, 1922, Lausanne Conference on 
Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923, Records ,Pf Proceedings 
and Draft Terms !Jf Peace, p. 134. Hereafter referred 
to as Proceedings. 
2. Lord Curzon, December 6, Proce..§..dings, p. 141-142. 
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••• The means taken by Turkey to prevent enemy ships from 
using the Straits shall not be of such a nature as to in-
terfere vdth the free passage of neutral vessels, 
"2 .• !,!! regards sh.i£S of ~~ in time of peace there 
shall be complete freedom of passage for all flags ••• sub-
ject to limi te.tion on the number and duration of stay of 
the warships of one power in a Turkish port. 
"In time of war when Turkey is neutral there shall 
be complete freedom of passage for warships as in time of 
peace. 
"In time of war, when Turkey is belligerent there 
shall be freedom of pas sage for neutral ships onl y. 11 · 
II It has otten been stated that the de~ire ot the 
Western Powers is to impose upon Turkey aome euob solution 
as would leave the Capital of the Turkish State &t the 
mercy of a hostile fleet."l However, this. was a false 
ob serve.tion. 
Under the Allied proposals Turkey was to retain the 
right to prevent belligerent warships from entering the 
Straits When Turkey was at war. Only neutral warships 
were to be permitted to pass. Further, the freedom of 
passage for commercial vessels durins wartime in which 
Turkey was belligerent would be slightly restricted, the 
right of visit and search being retained for Turkey, in 
order to prevent the transportation of troops or contra-
band. 2 "Finally, in the event of a war in which Turkey 
herself is neutral, the Allied Powers agree to the im-
position upon belligerent warships of the conditions and 
1. Lord Curzon, Second Meeting of the Straits Commission, 
December 6, 1922 , Proceedings, p. 142. 
2. Ibid., p. 142. 
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restrictions defined in the thirteenth Hague Convention of 
1907 regarding maritime neutrality."! 
"Iri order to ensure the due carrying out of the above 
rules, the Allies propose (1) that certain zones to be 
fi~ed on the European and Asiatic shores of the Dardanelles 
and Bosphorus sha.ll be effectively demilitarized; (2) that 
an international commission shall be set up with the nec-
essary technical services both to provide for the buoying, 
lighting, quarantine defense of the waters," of the Straits, 
"and to supervise and inspect the demilitarization of the 
land zones."~ 
Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Jugoslavia, the Serbs-Croate 
and Slovenes, Japan, ~nd the United States found themselves 
in close agreement with the Allied proposals.. Their views 
were stated in timely speeches, delivered to the Commission 
at various steps during the proceedings. Some of the talks 
were quite eloquent in their appeals to the consideration 
of world interests. However, each delegation made certain 
that their own nation was vitally concerned with the final 
disposition of the Straits. Turkey and Russia, especially, 
remained unconvinced of the justice of the Allied proposals, 
despite Lord Curzonts expositions. 
Turkey in expressing her desires stated that the 
Straits and Constantinople must be preserved against pos-
sible surprise a.ttacks. The only advisable method of 
protection against surprise attacks would be by means of 
fortifications and adequate defenses. In this way only 
1 .. I,ord Curzon~ Second Meeting of the Straits Commission,. 
December 6, 1922, Proce.edings, p. 142 .. See J. B .. 
Scott, The Hague Conventions of 1898 ~ 1907, p .. 209. 
2 .. Pro c_eeding s, p. 143. 
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could Turkey defend her shores and city should some Power 
threaten her or the freedom of the Straits.l 
"Once these districts are secured against surprise 
attack, any State which violated its international engage- · 
ments would have no chance of gaining an immediate victory, 
and the Powers would be enabled to take such measures as 
the circumstances required. 11 1 
In other words, Turkey would be responsible for her 
own safety and the Powe:rs would have the f reedom of the 
Straits insured, both 'by their own e.ctions e,nd by the a.'-d 
of Turkey. In accordance with these considerations, Turkey 
set forth the bases of h$r program, which She wiShed to 
establish; they were as follows: 
11 (1) A guarantee securing the Straits, Constantinople 
and the Sea. of Marmora against surprise attack by land or 
sea. 
11 {2) Limitation of the naval forces which may enter 
the Black Sea, so they shall not constitute a. danger for 
the districts between the two Straits and in the Black 
Sea. 
11 (3) The freedom of passage both in war and peace for 
merchantmen; in case Turkey is a belligerent she will be 
satisfied with such technical control as is indispensible. 11 2 
Turkey, then, agreed with the Allies that there should 
be same sort of demilitarized zone, provided means could 
be found to assure her of adequate protection for her 
interests and territory. She accepted the principle of 
the creation of a Commission for the regulation of the 
1. Ismet Pasha, head of the Turkish Delegation, third meet-
ing of the Straits Commission, December 8, 1922, 
Proceedings, p. 158. 
2. Proceedings, p. 158. 
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navigation of the Straits. Finally, she accepted without 
qualification the principle of freedom of passage for mer-
chant vessels. 
However, Turkey did have certain specific objections 
to the Allied proposals which may be outlined as follows: 
(1) The Sea of Marmora should not be included in the 
"Straits 11 since fortj.f'ications on 1 ts snores are necessary 
for the defence of Anatolia and Thrace.l 
(2) It is useless to create a demi~itarized ~one ~­
round Constantinople since a railway line serves as an 
important connection between Anatolia and Thrace, and since 
Constantinople possesses a garrison, It should be suffi-
cient to 11 ., ,indicate that there should be no land or sea 
fortifications on either shore. nl 
(3) The movement of troops within the demilitarized 
areas must be allowed because the zones connect Anatolia 
and Thrace,l 
(4) Turkey must be allowed to maintain arsenals and 
other naval establishments at Constantinople in order to 
defend the shores of the Sea of Marmora by fleet,l 
11 (5) The area of the demilitarized zones is too ex-
tensive." 1 
. (6) The three islands of Imbros, Tenedos, Samothrace 
must be given to Turkey, and Lemnos must be declared 
1. Proceedings, pp. 158-159. 
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autonomous .. l 
(7) A minimwn means of defense should be permitted 
on the Gallipoli peninsula to protect it against surprise 
attack.l· 
The Allies in replying to these objections refused 
to admit the possibility of extracting the Se~ or Marmora 
from the term ttthe Straits". This we.e El. vi t$1 part of the 
passageway they claim~d, a.nd the ability to l?revent free 
pe.esage in that Sea meant the possibility · of hindering of 
t?e passage through the two outlets. The adequate defense 
of the ports and railheads on the shores of the Marmora. could 
be provided without removing the Sea from the "Straits". 
Ae for the demilitarized zones on the Boephorus, the Allies 
considered that they should 'be mainta ined, but that the 
movement of troupe across the zones might be allowed, pro-
vided, of course, that the troops were in transit. As for 
the maintenance of arsenals at Constantinople there was no 
disagreem~nt in principle. The Allies could no~ see wherein 
the zones were too large, nor could they agree that the 
sovereignty of Lemnos or Samothrace could be transferred 
from Greece. As for the last objection, the Allies could 
not agree with the Turkish demands, for they considered 
that by placing Kavak outside the demilitarized zone Turkey 
1. Proceedings, pp. 158-159~ 
,..... .. 
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could maintain a force of sufficient size there for the 
pro t ection of the peninsula. FUl~thermore, Turkey would 
be permitted to retain on the peninsula a gendarmerie to 
preserve Ol"der.l The Allies considered that these provi-
sions should satisfy Turkey's request for "un minimum de 
-- -
moyens ~defense," 
As the discussions continued in the sessions of the 
'rerri torial and Military Commission, the Turkish delegati on 
brought itself into closer harmony with the Allied views, 
Quite early she repudiated ~he Russian viewpoint concerning 
.• 
the proposed reglement and accepted. the Allied proposals 
in general,2 'lbere were certe.in demands, however, that 
Turkey continued to press, which delayed the final settle-
ment, She insisted that a force should be allowed on the 
Gallipoli peninsula; that the Turkish forces should not be 
limited in any way outside the zones and that e.dequate 
. 
guarantees for the security of the Sea of Marmora and Con ... 
stantinople should be given. In respect to this last point 
Turkey submitted a formula for providing political guar-
antees to her city and the Marmora shore.3 Objections con-
tinued to be made concerning the proposed Commission of the 
Straits on the grounds that by allowing the Conunission to 
1. Proceedings' p. 169 and p. 285. 
2. fsmet Pasha, Third Meeting of the Straits Commission, 
·December 8, Proceedings, pp. 156-158. 
3. Ismet Pasha, Sixth Meeting of the Straits Commission, 
December 19, 1922, Proceedings, pp. 270-271. 
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supervise the demilite~ization of the zones the sovereignty 
of Turkey would be impaired.l 
The Allies, however, would not make any further con-
cessions despite further pleas and demands. Finally on 
February 4, 1923, the Turkish delegation accepted the pro-
posals of the Allies respecting the Straits. 
"We have abandoned the principle of the closing of 
the Straits, a principle which, as has been proved by past 
experience, is hi~tor:tc~lly that which most adequately 
secures the safety or our capital, and we have ag~eed that 
the waters of the Straits shall be open to the ships of 
all nations. Pu:rthe:r, in spite of the t'aot that ln ·maP.y 
cases where both shores of an open-waterway belong~ng to a 
single Power, that Power retains by usage the right of 
fortification, we have agreed in the present instance to 
demilitarization, 
"We have also abandoned our request regarding the 
maintenance of a garrison in the Gallipoli peninsula."2 
The work of the Conference had come to an end but 
still the Turkish delegation refused to sign the treaty 
because of certain economic and judicial proposals. The 
Conference failed on February 4, 1923, despite the efforts 
of all concerned to reach an agreement. The results of 
the Conference were not cast out but retained pending 
future negotia.tions, which all expected to come a few 
months later. 
1. Irunet Pasha, Seventh Meeting of the Straits Commission, 
December 20, Proceedin~s, p. 286. 
2. Memorandum presented bysmet Pasha to the Presidents 
of the British, French and Italian delegations, Lausanne, 
February 4, 1923, Proceedings, p. 838. 
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The Russian Proposals for the Straits 
In the meantime it would be well to examine the main 
outlines of the Russian proposals regarding the establish-
ment of the Straits' regime. This subject has been pur-
posefullr reserved because at no time during the Conference 
were the proposals made by Russia seriously considered as 
possible of execution. The Allies and the other ~epresent~ 
atives, including Turkey, e.lJ. he,d accepted tl.le pr1nciple 
that the Straits should. be completely free from al~ re~ 
strictions, while the Russians based their proposal~ on an 
entirely opposite viewpoint. 
Following the Russian Revolutions of 1917 Russia d~­
veloped the idea that the Western Powers had imperialistic 
designs on "free Russia." In order to combat this peril, 
she firmly believed that the only method of protection 
from this area lay in erecting an impenetrable barrier be-
tween Russia and her enemies, In much the srume fashion 
that England had blocked the Russian advence toward the 
Mediterranean before the war, the Russians now wished to 
block the British advance towa.rd the Black Sea region. 
It cannot be said that Russia was poorly represented 
at the Conference, for such was not true, but the Soviet 
delegation headed by M. Chicherin waged a losing battle 
from the beginning; there being nine States solidly opposed 
to the Russians. Even Turkey, to whom the greatest advan-
tages would accrue under the Russian scheme, repudiated 
... , ... 
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the Soviet proposals, for reasons already mentioned.l 
Russia came to the Conference with two fundamental 
principles to guide her in the discussions. They were: 
»(1) equality for Russia and her Allies with other Powers 
as regards position and rights, and (2) the preservation of 
peace and security in the territories of Russia and the 
republics allied with her and freedom in their economic 
rela tiona with other countries ."2 The permanent f reedom 
for commercie,l navigation and for peacef1,tl maritiwe cQm-
munications in the Straits must be insured absolutely and 
wi t hout any restrictions.2 Lasting guarantees should be 
provided for the maintenance of peace in the Black Sea, 
and on its shores, »peace in the Near East and the security 
ot Constantinople ••• " by closing the Dardanelles and the 
Bosphorus permanently to all warships, armed vessels and 
military aircraft in peace time and in war time to all na-
tions with the exception of Turkey. 3 
To accomplish these objectives the sovereign rights 
of the Turkish people must be recognized over all Turkish 
territory and wa ters. In order to defend the Straits 
effectively against all possible' att a cks the Russian Gov-
ernment insisted that the Turkish Government should be 
1. Turkey was undoubtedly influenced on account of her 
pledges given in the lJludros and JKudania armistices 
to desert the Russian viewpoint which Turkey supported 
at first. See Proceedin&s, p. 134, and above p. 69. 
2. M. Chicherin, First Meeting of the Straits Commission, 
December 4, 1922, Proceedings, p. 129. 
3. M. Chicherin, ibid., p. 129. 
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given the express right to "··~fortify and arm its co asts, 
to possess a war fleet and to ap ply to the defence of the 
Stra its a nd of the Sea of ~k~rmora all the technic~l acces-
sories of modern warfa re."l 
To this thesi s the Russi c:m delegR.tion adhered consis-
tently throughout the Conference, making but few minor 
conces s ions. Russia would a llow the Turkish Government 
to permit entrance of light wa ren ips wi t hin the Stra its 
or the Black Sea for specia l ca s es a nd for specific p~r­
poses, but this a ction would h~ve to be a pproved by the 
Na tiona l Assembly.a 
The Soviet proposa ls were made with a view towa rd 
re ... establishing the same sort of a r eg ime over the Straits 
tha t obtained prior to the wa r.3 The very status which 
the Allies were a ttempting to abolish wa s advocF.t.t ed openly 
and strenuously by Russia , but to no ava il, for the Allied 
Powers would not trust the Turkish porter nor the Russia n 
protector of Turkey. 
Turkey Accepts the Trea ty of Lausanne 
Following the abrupt ending of the Conference on 
Februa ry 4, the va rious delegations dispersed leaving the 
1. M. Chicherin, ibid., p. 129. 
2. The Rus s i a n Delegation's DrF.t.ft, Proceedings, pp. 250-253 .. 
See als o Appendix VI. 
3. Compare the Russian Draft and the provisions of the 
treaties of 1841, 1856 and 1871 in Appendices V & VI. 
Conference Secretariat at Lausanne in the hope that the 
negotiations might subsequently be renewed. 
74 
About a month later the Angora Government made known 
its refusal to accept the Lausanne treaty on the grounds 
that the settlement was contrary to the spirit expressed 
in the Turkish National Pact of 1920. The opposition to 
the treaty was ohie.fly because of certain economio a,nd 
financial measuree.l On Maroh 8, 1923, Ismet Pasha direct-
ed notes to the varioue interested Governments stating the 
attitude of the Angora Government concerning the treaty. 
A Conference of the Allies gathered in London under 
the presidency of Lord Curzon on 'March 21, to consider a 
reply which would be sent to Angora. After careful dis-
cussion of the Turkish counter-proposals a declaration was 
drafted and approved. Identic notes were sent by the Allies 
to Angora, inviting Turkey to resume the negotiations at 
Lausanne. The invitation being acceptable, the Conference 
began anew, April 22. Discussion of the Straits question 
was unnecessary since tha t Convention had already been 
accepted by Turkey.2 
On July 8, it was announced that agreement had been 
reached on all of the outstanding points namely; the Otto-
man Debt, "Concessions", and the problems regarding evac-
uation. The following day a special cabinet meeting of 
1 .. "Turkey,tt Current History, XVIII, p. 176, April, 1923 .. 
2. See above p. 70. 
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the Turkish Government met under Mustapha Kemal Pasha and 
authorized Ismet Pasha to sign the Treaty as agreed upon 
by the negotiators.1 
In Lausanne, the entire text of the Treaty was review-
ed July 17, and the signatures of the participants were 
affixed to the documents, July 24, 1923, in the main hall 
of the University of Lausanne.2 Jugoslavia refused to 
sign the Treaty because of her objectione to the apportion-
ment of the Ottoman de'bt •. 
The Soviet Government informed the Conf~reno~. July 20, 
that it was prepared to sign the Straits Convention. On 
August 14, 1923, M. Jordianski, Chief of the Russian delega~ 
tion at Rome signed the Convention.3 On August 23, the 
National Assembly ratified the Treaty, there being 215 
affirmative votes cast out of 235 .. 4 
Keeping their pledge, the Allies evacuated Constan-
tinople, beginning at midnight of the B8~e day and complet-
ing the operation at noon October 2, 1923.5 
The Convention of the Straits 
The Treaty of Peace declares the principle of the 
freedom of the Straits in Article 23 as follows: 
1. tt.Signing of the Tre8,ty of Lausanne," Current History, 
XVIII, p. 1049, September, 1923. 
2. Ibid .. , p. 1049. 
3. '*Russia," Current History, XIX, p. 173,. October, 1923 .. 
4. "Turkey." Current History,. XIX, p. 176,. October, 1923 .. 
5. Ibid., p. 173. 
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"The high contracting parties are agreed to recog-
nize and declare the principle of freedom of transit and 
navigation, by sea and by air, in time of peace as in 
time of war, in the strait of the Dardanelles, the Sea of 
Marmora and the Bosphorus, as prescribed in the separate 
convention signed this day, regarding the regime of the 
Straits. This convention will have the same force and 
effect in so fe.r as the present high contracting parties 
are concerned as if it formed part of the present treaty."l 
The British Em.piz•e, France, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, 
Greece, Rumania., Russia., the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and 
Turkey " ••• being desirous of ensuring in the Straits free ... 
dom of transit and navigation between . the Meditel:'ranean 
Sea and the Black Sea for all nations in accordance with 
the principle laid down in Article 23 of the Treaty ••• " 
signed the Convention of the Straits providing for the new 
regime for that passageway. 
The signatories recognized and declared the principle 
of freedom of transit and navigation by sea and ·by air with~ 
in the Straits2, such transit being regulated by pro~isions 
set forth in an annex to Article 2 of the Convention,3 For 
merchant vessels and non-military aircraft during peace 
time there was to be complete freedom of navigation and 
passage, day or night, under any flag with any kind of cargo, 
without any formalities, or ta.x or charge whatever unless 
for services directly rendered.4 In time of war, Turkey 
1. Article 23, Treaty With Turkey, signed July 24, 1923, 
Great Britain Foreign Office~ Treaty Series 1923, 
no. 16. (Treaty of Lausanne J. 
2. Art. 1. 3. Art. 2. 4. Art. 2. Annex, l, a. 
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being neutral, there was to be complete freedom of naviga-
tion· under the srone conditions and Turkey's rights and 
duties as a neutral cannot authorize her to ts.ke any meas-
ures which might interfere with the freedom of navige.tion 
within the Straits .1 In time of vrar 1 Turkey being a bel-
ligerent, there was to be freedom of navigation for neutral 
vessels and non-military aircraft 1f not assisting t~e en~my 
by oarrying troops o~ contraband, Turkey was to ret~in the 
right of visit and search, The rights of ~Irkey to apply 
to enemy vessels the measures allowed by 1ntern,atio:ru1l 
le.w were not affected, Furthermore 1 Turkey was to have 
full power to take measures to prevent enemy vessels from 
using the Straits, so long as those measures would not 
hinder the free passage of neutral vessels,2 
For warships, fleet auxilie.ries., troopships, aircraft 
carriers, and military aircraft there was to be in peace 
time complete fr~edom of passage, day or night under any 
flag without any formalities, or tax, or charge but sub-
ject to restrictions as to total force as follows: "The 
maximum force which any one Power may send through the 
Straits into the Black Sea is not to be greater than that 
of the most powerful fleet of the littoral Powers of the 
Blacl<: Sea existing in that sea at the time of passage; 
but with the proviso that the Powers reserve to themselves 
1. Art. 2. Annex, 1, b. 2. Art. 2. Annex, 1, c. 
........ 
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the right to send ;tnto the Black Sea, at e.ll times and 
under all circumstances, a force of not more than three 
ships, of which no individual ship shall exceed 10,000 
tons."1 Turkey was relieved of all responsibility in re-
gard to the number of war vessels that should pass and 
this duty was assigned to the Straits Commission, which 
was to report twice each year to the League of Nations 
regarding the forces within the Black See.,2 · In t~me of 
war, T~key being neutral the~e was to be complete f~eedom 
of passage under the same conditions as li mted abov~, 3 
Wa.r sh;i.ps and military aircraft of belligerepts were !'or-
bidden to exercise any belligerent right within the Straits, 
such as capture, visit and search etc, Warships were to 
be subject to the Thirteenth Hague Convention of 1907 deal-
ing with maritime neutrality in regard to revictualling 
and carrying out repairs, 4 In time of war, Turkey being e. 
belligerent, there was to be complete freedom of ps.ssage 
for neutral warships under the same conditions and limita-
tions as in paragraph 2 (a), But the means used by Turkey 
to prevent the passage of enemy craft were not to be of 
such a nature as would hinder the free passage of neutral 
craft.5 
1. Art. 2, Annex, 2, a. 
2. Art. 2, Annex, 2, a. These reports may be found pub-
lished semi-annually in the Official Journal of the 
League of Nations. 
3. Art. 2, Annex 2, a. 
4. See J. B. Scott, ££• cit., p. 209. 
5. Art. 2, Annex, 2, c. 
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Turkey could make such regulations as she saw fit 
regarding the number of men-of-war and military aircraft 
of any one Power which might visit Turkish ports or aer-
odromes at one time and the duration of stay.l The Black 
Sea littoral Powers were to enjoy the same rights in this 
respect,2 Special sanitary ~egulations were also p~ovided.3 
Demilitarized zones were outlined including ~oth of 
the shores of the Dardanelles and the Bo~phorus. 4 These 
zones were to be completely demilitarize~,5 Turk.ey was to 
be permitted, however, to maintain a garrison not to exceed 
12,000 men in the ne1~1brohood of Constantinople for the 
defense of the cit¥.6 Furthermore, Turkey was to retain 
the right to transport her armed forces through the de-
militarized zones and islands of Turkish Territory as well 
as through her territorial waters where the Turkish fleet 
was to have the right to anchor,7 and Turkey was to retain 
the right to move her fleet freely within Turkish waters,8 
In order to carry out the provisions regulating the 
passage of ships through the Straits,9 a Commission was to 
be constituted at ConstantinoplelO comprised of a represent-
ative of Turkey who was to be president, and representatives 
of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Greece, 
1. Art. 2, Annex 5, a. 2. Art. 2, Annex, 5, b. 
3. Art. 2, Annex 6, 
4. Art. 4. See map in Appendix. 
5. Art. 6, and 7. 
6. Art. 8. 7. Art. 6. 




Ruma.n1e, Russia, and the Serb-Croat Slovene State in so 
far as those States were signatories of' the Convention.l 
Other littoral Powers of the Black Sea could, by signing 
the Convention, possess the same right.l The Commission 
was to exercise its functions over the waters of the Straits,2 
under the auspices of the League of Nations, to which it was 
to address an annual report " ••• giving an aocount of its 
activities, and furniShing all information which may be 
useful in the interests of oonnne:rce and ne..vigation."3 
The Powers agreed that should the freedom of naviga-
tion of the Straits or the security of the demilitarized 
zones be imperilled by violations of the provisions regard" 
ing the freedom of passage, they would meet such violations, 
or attacks, or threats of war by all means that the Council 
of the League should determine for this purpose. This was 
agreed upon, on account of the danger that Turkey bore, be-
cause of the demilitarized zones,4 This provision gave a 
sort of a political guarantee to Turkey. 
These, in general, were the terms of the Convention 
of the Straits as embodied in the rrreaty of Lausanne. 'rhe 
other provisions of the treaty as well as of the Convention 
were of such a nature that there was no question of their 
enforcement. By this Convention a new type of regime was 
set up by the .F owers in accord with the more advanced 
1. Art. 12. 2. Art. 11. 3. Art. 15. 4. Art. 18. 
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principles of freedom for international maritime and air 
navigation through international thoroughfares. It had 
taken almost an hundred yee.rs to secure freedom of navi-
gation through the Straits for warships, and to provide 
for the non-closing of the Straits during war time. Dip-
lomatically, the task has been accomplished·, but the Con-
vention of the Straits needs to be tested by war before 
its value can be reali~ed. Sinoe 1923 there has been no 
"Question of the Straits," 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Such a problem as this does not easily admit solution. 
It can not be thought that the "Question of the Straits" is 
settled for all times to come, for the changing needs o:r 
civilization, end the changing ideals and principles that 
guide human organizations can not be successfully devined, 
Each age must solve its own problems according to the needs 
and exigencies of the time, being guided, of course, by its 
ideals of justice and right, At the present time we have 
been guided by the principles of internationalizat~on, Im" 
portant highways of the sea and air are considered as too 
valuable to be under the exclusive control of one nation, 
consequently our international engagements tend to approxi-
mate the ideal of internationalization, / The "new regime of 
the Straits" is the first realization in the case of an 
important waterway where the principle of the "freedom of 
the seas" has been applied, Its guarantees are unique, 
for they rest upon the mutual good will of the nations. 
The Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, end Singapore are heavily 
armed for protection, the Straits separating Europe and 
Asia are completely dise.rmed~ Which position is the most 
adequately guaranteed1 
No real estimate of the new regime can be given at 
the present time, for this reason; during the past fifty 
years peace-time commerce has not been hindered and the 
8:3 
test or any control over the Straits is not its effective-
ness in peace time but in war time. Until a war comes Which 
involves the Straits, our opinions concerning the regime . 
must begin and end in speculation. All that can be done is 
to hope for the best in the future. It must be remembered 
in this connection that although Russia signed the Lausanne 
settlement with regard to the Straits, she was not satisfied. 
Wh~ther Russia wil l continue to be silent 11 probl emati cal, 
If the Western Powers do not display their 1~peri~list1o 
tendencies in that direction, Russia will in all probability 
remain quiet. But Russia fears imperialism much a e the 
Western Powers fear Bolshevism, and until her fee.re are 
vanished the question will remain open, 
The settlement had same interesti~g sidelights, chief 
of which was the reversal of British and Russian policies 
regarding the Straits. Problems of international law were 
revised and created which serve as interesting bits of 
change found continually in this field. 
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Commerce passing the Bosphorus during the years 
1911-1913 inclusivel 
Flag Tonnage Percentage of 
1 9l3 1912 
English I 5,370,781 s 3'7,5 I 42,3 I 
I • I 
' 
• Greek I 1,958,201 • 1~ .7 • 16,4 : • • 
s : I s 
Austro-Hungarian 
• 
1,615,293 11.3 I 11 a 
I : I I 
Russian a 1,428,435 I 10 : 6.5 : 
• I • • • Turkish 906,416 6.3 : 5 I 
: . I 
German • 733,600 : 5,1 I 3.8 : • 










French : 572,730 • 4 : 3,3 I , 3.3 • 
: : • • Italian 370,302 • 2,6 • 3,8 : 6,2 • • 
• • I • • Roumanian • 350 ,Y/3 • 2.4 • 1,9 1,6 • • • 
• : • Belgian 295,038 2 • 1.6 : 1 • 
• : • • • Norwegian 288,203 2 : 1,3 
• : • • • • • 
Dutch • 199,034 1.4 • 1.1 • 1.6 • • • 
1, Revue conunerciale du Leva.nt, XXVIII (1914), P• 300. 
Quoted in Phillipson-and Buxton, op. cit., pp. 232-233. 
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II 
Map showing· the entrance of the DarO.anelles prior to 
the World We.r. 'l'he n'U.merous fo;rts represented hare were 
demolished in accordance with the terms of tne Treaties of 
s'evre s a.nd Lausanne ,l 
1. Taken from, The Dardanelles and _Their. -~~o~_'Y.:, by the 




Map of Turkey in Europe showing the Zone of the Straits 
\ 
as defined in the Treaty of' Sevres, signed Au.e;ust 10, 1920,1 
1. Allied and Associated Powers, Treaty with Turkey, signed 
at S~vres, France, August 10, 1920, British Foreign 
Office, Treaty Series 1920. 
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IV 
Map showing demilitarized zones and islands a s defined 
in Arti cle IV of the Convent~on of the St:rait ~ , ll31e:ne c:J., 
July 24 1 1923.1 
1. Adapted from, Allied Powers, Treaty with Turkey, signed 
at Lause.nne, Swi t z.erl enc1 , July 24, 1923, British For-
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International Engagements Respecting 
the Straits, 1807-19141 
Treaty of Tilsit, July 7, 1807 
Article II 
98 
11 As it h a.. s at all times been fo rbido.en for vessels 
of war to enter into the canal of Co.n.st~tinople, that 
is, into the Straits of the . Dard~nell.es aPd ~nto that 
of the Black Sea, and ~m that ancient r~le of the Ott9-
man Empire shguld be observed henceforth in times of 
peace with ref erence to any Powers whatsoeve~, the 
Court of Brita~n promisee also to conform to this prin .. 
oiple,"2 
Treaty of Adrianople, September, 1829 
Article VII 
"Russian subjects shall enjoy; throughout the 
whole extent of the Ottoman Empire, as well by land as 
by sea, the full and entire freedom of trade secured to 
them by the treaties concluded heretofore between the 
two High Contracting Po~ers •• , 
"The Sublime Porte engages, moreover, to take 
especial care tha.t th.e trade and navigation of the 
Black Sea, ·particularly, shall be impeded in no manner 
whatsoever, For this purpose it admits and declares 
the passage of the Strait of Constantinople and that 
of the Dardanelles to be entirely free and open to 
Russia.n vessels under the merchant flag, laden or in 
1. The portions of the treaties herein cited are offered 
in order that a comparison may be made between the 
status of the Straits prior to the World War and 
following that war. Compare these citations vdth the 
Russian Delegation's Draft. (Appendix VI) 
2. Noradounghian, G., Recueil d 1 actes internationaux de 1' 
Empire Ottoman (4 vols. 1~97-1903), II, p. 81, quoted 
in Shotwell, J.T. "A Short History of the Question of 
Constantinople and the Straits." Documents of the 
American Association for International ConciliatiOn 
l922, no. 180, p. 497-:-- - -
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ballast, whether they come from the Black Sea for - the 
purpose of entering the Mediterranean, or whether, 
coming from the Mediterranean, they wish to enter the 
Black Sea; such vessels, provided they be merchant 
ships, whatever their size and tonnage, shall be ex-
posed to no hindrance or annoyance of any kind, as 
above provided,.. In virtue of the same principle 
the passage of the Strait of Constantinople and that 
of the Dardanelles is declared free and open to all 
the merchant ships of Powers who are at peace with 
the Sublime Porte, whether going into the Russian. ports 
or the Black Sea or coming from them ••• upon the same 
conditions which are stipulated for vessels under the 
Russian flag. 
' 
"Lastly, the SUblime Porte, recognizing in tbe 
Imperial . Court of Russie. the right of eecuri,ng the 
necessary guarantees for this full treadom ot trade 
and navigation in the Black Sea, ~eclares solemnly; 
that on · its pQrt not the least obstacle Shall ever, 
under any pretext whatsoever, be opposed to it. Above 
all, it promises never to allow itself henceforth to 
stop or detain vessels laden or in ballast, whether 
Russian or belonging to nations with Wham the · Ottoman 
Porte shall not be in a state of declared war, which 
vessels shall be passing through the Strait of Con ... 
stantinople and that of the Dardanelles, on their way 
from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean, or from 
the Mediterranean into the Russian ports of the Black 
Sea,., nl 
Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, 1833 
Separate Secret Clause 
" ••• The Sublime Ottoman Porte, in place of the 
help which it is bound to furnish in case of need, 
according to the principle of reciprocity in the open 
treaty, Shall limit its action in favor of the Imperial 
Court of Russia to closing the Straits of the Dardan-
elles, that is to say, not to permit any foreign shi~ 
of war to enter therein tmder any pretext whatever." 
1. Noradounghian, £E• ~., II, p. 166, quoted in Shotwell, 
~· cit., pp. 499-502. 
2. Noradounghian, £E• cit., II, p. 231, ibid., P• 503. 
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Treaty of London, 1840 
Article III 
"If Mehemet Ali, a.fter having refused to submit 
to the conditions of the arrangement above mentioned 
(specified in a separate Act), should direct his land 
or sea forces against Constantinople, the High Con-
tracting Parties, upon the express demand of the .Sul ... 
tan, addressed to their Representatives at Constantin~ 
ople, agree, in such case, to comply with the request 
of that Sovereign, and to provide for the ~efence of 
his throne oy means of a oooperation agreed upon by 
mutual consent, for the purpose of placing the two 
Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, ae well as 
the capital or the Ottoman Empire, in security against 
all agression ••• 
Article IV 
"It is, however, expressly u,nderl;'ltood, that the 
cooperation mentioned in t~e preceding Article, and 
destined to place the Straits of the :Pa.rdan,elles and 
of the Bosphorus, and the Ottoman cap~tal, vnder the 
temporary safeguard of the High Contracting Parties 
against all agression of Mehemet Ali, Shall be con-
sidered only as a measure of exception adopted at the 
express demand of the Sultan, and solely for his de-
fence in the single case above-mentioned; but it is 
agreed that such measure shall not · derogate .in any · 
degree from the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, 
in virtue of which it has in all times been prohibited 
for ships of war of foreign Powers to enter the Straits 
of the Dardanelles and of· the Bosphorus. And the Sul-
tan on the one hand, hereby declares that, excepting 
the contingency above-mentioned, ·it is his firm resolu~ 
tion to maintain in future this principle invariably 
established as the ancient rule of his Empire; and as 
long as the Porte is at peace, to admit no foreign 
ship of war into the Straits of the Bosphorus and of 
the Dardanelles; on the other hand, their Majesties 
the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and 
Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all 
the Russias, engage to respect this determination of 
the Sultan(. and to conform to the above-mentioned 
principle. '1 
1. Parlia.mentary · Papers, LXXXIII, no. 43, p. 20, Shotwell, 
~· cit., p. 507-509. 
The Convention of the Straits, 1841 
Article I 
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nHis Highness the Sultan, on the one part, declares 
that he is firmly resolved to mainte.in for the future 
the principle invariably established as the ancient 
rule of the Empire, and in virtue of which it has a.t 
all times been prohibited for the Ships of War of Foreign 
Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles end the 
Bospborus; and that so long as the Po~te is at peace, 
His Highness will admit no Foreign Ship of War into the 
said Straits, · 
nAnd their Majesties the Queen of,' the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Irelan~, the Emperor of Austria, 
King of Uunga.ry and Bohemia., the King of the French, · . 
the King of Prussia, and the Emperor Qf all the Russias, 
on the other part, ensa.gi to respect this det@rmina.tion 
or the Sultan ~d to conform themselvQs to the principle 
above declared, 
Article II 
nit is underetooO. that in reool•d:l,ng the :Lnviolabil· 
ity of the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire mentioned 
in the preceding Article, the Sultan reserves to him-
self, as in past times, to deliver Firmans of passage 
for light Vessels under Flag of War, which shall be 
employed as is usual in the service of the Missions of 
Foreign Powers, 
Article III 
"His Highness, the Sultan, reserves to himself to 
c~nmunicate the present Convention to all the Powers 
with whom the Snblin1e Forte is in relations of friend-
ship 1 inviting them to accede tliereto, "l 
Treaty of Paris, 1856 
"w~th reference to the Straits, a separate Con-
vention between the six Powers (including Sardinia) 
and the Sultan, signed the same time as the Treaty and 
attached to it (by Article X of the Treaty) reaffirmed · 
textually the clauses of the Convention of the Straits. 11 2 
1. Shotwell, ~· cit., pp. 510-11~ 




"The Black Sea is neutralized; ii~s Waters end 
Ports, ··thrown open to the Mercantile Marine o:r every 
Nation, are formally and perpetually interdicted to 
the Flag of War, .either of the . Powers possessing its 
Coasts, or of any other Power ••• 
Article XIII 
"The Black Sea being neutralized according to 
the terms of Article XI, the maintenance or establish~ 
. ment upon its Coast of Militarr-Mar~tim$ Ar3enals be~ 
comes ·alike unnecessa.ry and purposelessJ in conseq~unce, 
His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, gnd His 
Imperial Majesty the Sulten, engage not to ~~tablish 
or to me.iptain upon the Coast Gtny Milite.ry-M~ritime 
Arsenal. "l 
Treaty of London, March 13, 1871 
Article I 
"Articles XI, XIII · and XIV of the Treaty of Paris 
of the 30th March, 1856, as well as the special conven-
tion concluded between Russia and the Sublime Porte, 
and annexed to the said Article XIV, are abrogated, 
and replaced by the following article. 
· Article II 
"The princlple of the closing of the Straits of 
the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, such as it has been 
established by the separate convention of the 30th 
March, 1856, is maintained, with power to His Imperial 
Majesty the Sultan to open the said Straits in time 
of peace to vessels of war of friendly and allied Powers, 
in case the Sublime Pol~te should judge it necessary in 
order to secure the execution of the stipulations of 
the Treaty of Paris of the 30th March, 1856. 
Article III 
"The Black Sea remains open, as heretofore, to 
the mercantile marine of all nations. 
1. Shotwell,~· ~., pp. 514-15. 
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Article VIII 
"The high contracting parties renew andconf'irm 
all stipulations of the Treaty of 30th March, 1856 1 as 
well a.s of its annexes, which are not annulled or 
modified by the present treaty."l 





The Russian Delegation's Draftl 
-.. --
Regulations for the Passage of Vessels through 
the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora 
and the Bosphorus 
Chapter I.--General Provisions 
104 
Al'tiole 1, The t~rm 11 the Straits" used below ineludes 
the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, the Bosphorus and the 
islands in the Aegean Sea adjacent to the Straits (Swmo-
thraoe, Imbros, Tenedos, Lemnos and Rabbit islands), as 
well as the territorial waters of the Straits, 
Art. 2. The sovereignty of 'Iurkey over the Straits is 
confirmed, The islands of Samothrace and Lemnos are de-
olared to be autonomous, 
Chapter II.--Rules for the Passage of Vessels 
through the Straits 
1. In Time of Peace 
(a,) Merchant Vessels and Cmmnercial Aircraft. 
Art. 3. Complete freedom of passage through the 
Straits for merchant vessels and connnercial aircraft 
under any flag, by day and by night. 
Commercial aircraft fly over the Straits in conformity 
1. Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923 
Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace. H •. 
M. Stationery Office, London, 1923; pp. 250-253. 
. ··-- -..... ~ --~-
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with the stipulations of the aerial: conventions signed by 
the Turkish Government or the special rules published by 
the said Government, 
(b.) War Vessels and Military Aircraft. 
Art. 4. In virtue of long~established principle, the 
Straits are recognised as closed to the war vessels, in-
cluding submr-~.rines, of all fleets 1 except that qf Turkey, 
Art. 5, Passage over the Straits ia prohi~~teq to 
all military aircraft, except those belonging to ~rkey, 
Art, 6, In very exceptional cases, powever, and for 
special definite reasons, the Turkish Government me;y, by 
special decrees, which shall be published separately on 
each occasion, authorise the passage of the Straits in 
both directions by ligbt warships (submarines excluded) 
of any flag, but on no account with a military object, 
Art, 7. No landing shall be made within the Straits 
by the light warships allowed by the TUrkish Government 
to pass the Straits in virtue of article 6, Neither may 
any armament, engine of war, munitions nor any other war 
material be landed from these vessels. 
Art. 8, Every light warship authorised to pass the 
Straits must notify the Turkish Government beforehand of 
the time of its entrance into the Straits so as to enable 
the said Government to verify the permission issued. 
2, In Time of War, Turkey being Neutral 
(a,) Merchant Ves sels and Commercial Aircraft, 
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Art, 9, Article 3 of these regu;Lations remains .oper- · 
,~~o, . 
ative, Turkey, however, will enjoy all the rights and 
fulfil all the obligations prescribed by international 
law in order to safeguard her neutrality as a sovereign 
State. 
(b.) Warships and Mili.tary A~rcraft, 
Art, 10, l n e~cQ~tional i ndividu&l case~ and for 
special definite reasons, the Turkish Govarrun~nt may 
' 
authorise the pas sage of the Straits by light* ne~tral 
warships (submarines excluded), in conformity with the 
rules established by articles 6, 7, a and 9, 
Art, 11. No warship of the belligerent rowers 
(submarines included), no military aircraft belonging to 
the belligerent Po·wers and no aircraft belonging to a 
neutral Power will be allowed to pass the Straits, 
3, In Time of War, Turkey being a Belligerent 
(e..) Merchant Vessels and Connnerc1al Aircraft, 
Art, 12. Merchant vessels and commercial aircraft of 
neutral Powers will be allowed freely to pass the Straits 
in conformity with articles 3 and 9 of these regulations, 
Turkey, however, will enjoy the rights allowed by inter-
national law to Powers in a state of war; particularly, 
* "Light warships" are understood to be warships not ex-
ceeding 6 1 000 tons, with guns not exceeding 15 em. 
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Turkey as a belligerent will have the right to search 
merchant vessels passing through the Straits and commer-
cial aircraft flying over the Straits. Special rules for 
the latter will be laid dovm by the Turkish Government. 
Art. 13. To the merchant vessels and commercial. air-
craft of enemy Powers Turkey will apply the international 
rules in force on the subject. 
(b.) Warships. 
Art. 14. In e~ceptional individual ca~es and for 
special definite reasons, the Turkish Qovernmant m~y 
authorise the passage of the Straits by light neutral 
warships (submarines excluded), in conformity with the 
rules established by articles 6 1 7, 8 and 9; subject to 
the right of Turkey to apply the rules which she considers 
necessary in her capacity as a belligerent party. 
Chapter !!I.--Guarantees 
Art. 15. Turkey undertakes towards all the signa-
tories of these regulations jointly and to each signator~ 
severally to see to the enforcement of these regulatio~~· 
Art. 16. In conformity with the provisions of articles 
2 and 15 of these regulations Turkey, in order to safeguard 
her sovereignty and to enforce the principle of the closure 
of the Straits to war~hips and military aircraft, will 
have the right to take all the necessary measures, and 
particularly:--
(a.) To maintain free from any restriction, within 
the zone of the Straits, military and naval 
forces {submarines included) and air fo~oes. 
(b.) Freely to erect permanent fortifications and 
permanent emplacements for artillery of any 
calibre. 
(c.) To lay mine-fields, 
(d.) To construct military routes and railway$, 
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roa~~ and other means of communication necess~ry 
for ):ler defence, 
(e.) To organise any methods of liaison and observa-
tion, 
(f.) To maintain military and naval basea of ~efense, 
end aerodromes, 
(g.) Generally to organise the defence of' the Straits 
by employing there all technical ~eaources of' 
warfare which are now and which may in the 
future come into use. 
Chapter IV.- .. Teclmic al Pr ovi si ons 
Art, 17, Without prejudice to the sovereignty of 
Turkey and with a view to provide for the needs of 
commercial shipping, an international commission will 
be constituted, consisting of one representative of each 
littoral State of the Black Sea and one representative of 
each of the following States: Germany, United States of 
America, France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan. 
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Art, 18, The president of the commission will be the 
Turkish delegate; the seat of the commission is fixed at 
Constantinople, 
Art. 19. Turkey undertakes to place at the disposal 
of the commission the numbe~ of pilots necessary to ensu~e 
camme~cial navigation in the Straits. 
Art. 20. The $tatute of the commission will be laid 
down in detail in a special convention , w~icn will be 
drawn up with the oo-opere.tion of the States epec:U'ied in 
a~ticle 17 within a period of three months from tne date 
of the signature of these regulations, 
Chapter V.--General Provisions 
Art, 21. The contracting Powers are agreed to elab-
o~ate and sign within three months from the adoption of 
the p~esent regulation an international Act recognising 
the Black Sea as a mare clausum of the littoral Powers, 
/ 
even in the event of ch.enge s being me.de in the regime of 
the Straits which modify the above stipulations. 
Art. 22. These regulations shall remain in force for 
ten years. After the expiration of this period they may 
be prolonged or revised. 
(Formal clauses, ratification, &c., follow.) 
Additional Declaration 
The Russian Ukrainian and Georgian delegation declare 
that in the event of its draft regule.tions of the Straits 
'l'lf'' 
llO 
qu.estion being adopted by the Powers, Russia, the Ukraine 
and Georgia undertake to propose to the littoral Governments 
of the Black Sea the assembling of a conference with a view 
to the adoption of reciprocal guarantees for the effective 
security of their coasts. 
G. CHICHERIN, 
Principal Delegate of Ruse.ia, 
the Ukraine and Georgi~· 
Ouchy, Lausanne, 
December 18, 1922. 
